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This paper analyses the link between commercial policies and exports through a 
comparative analysis of the Asian giants—the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and 
India. While the PRC has surged ahead of India to dominate world manufactured 
exports, India has acquired competitive capabilities in skill-intensive services. Favorable 
initial conditions such as large domestic markets and low-cost productive labor have laid 
the foundations for the giants’ export success. While the gradual switch to market-
oriented commercial policies in the late 1970s drove trade-led growth in the giants, the 
PRC’s reforms were swifter and more coordinated. It has introduced an open door policy 
towards foreign direct investment (FDI), actively facilitated technological upgrading 
through FDI, steadily liberalized a controlled import regime, ensured a competitive 
exchange rate, and concluded more comprehensive free trade agreements (FTAs) with 
Asia’s developing economies. India has attempted to develop more effective commercial 
policies since 1991, especially to attract FDI and liberalize imports. Therefore, one might 
expect the gap in trade performance between the PRC and India to narrow over time. 
However, both giants face an uncertain world economic environment in the aftermath of 
the global financial crisis and future export success will depend on their evolving 
commercial policies. Critical issues that still to be resolved include how the giants will 
respond to the risk of protectionism, manage real exchange rates, promote the use of 
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1. Introduction  
 
The rise of the two giant Asian economies—the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and 
India—will have profound implications for the world economy for decades to come. Until 
the late 1970s, the PRC and India were poor economies with inward-oriented trade and 
investment regimes, central planning, and lackluster export sectors. A shift in 
commercial policies saw their rise as huge global exporters. Already, they make up over 
one-third of the world’s population and about one-tenth of its exports. The giants’ exports 
increasingly comprise sophisticated manufactures and services, rather than simple labor 
intensive exports. Rapid trade-led growth has lifted hundreds of millions out of poverty in 
both economies. And the giants’ exports and growth have rebounded faster than many 
others following the global financial crisis. This success is remarkable among Asia’s 
newly industrializing economies and even large developed countries (Amsden 2001, 
Madison 2007, Gerhaeusser et al. 2010). 
 
A growing body of literature has focused on the giants’ rise in world trade and the 
influence of commercial policies. Four major lines of research can be distinguished.  
 
The first suggests that the PRC’s remarkable structural transformation to the production 
of manufactures for export beginning in the late 1970s was largely unforeseen. Informed 
analysts note that the PRC’s performance “already has been the largest growth surprise 
ever experienced by the world economy” (Winters and Yusuf 2007, p. 1) and project that 
the two giants will both be among the world’s largest trading economies within a couple 
of decades (Winters and Yusuf 2007, Madison 2007).  
 
The second line of research differentiates between the giants and credits India with 
turning the corner beginning in the 1990s, but argues that its export performance is still 
not comparable to that of the PRC (Panagariya 2007). It is further argued that both 
countries started economic liberalization in the late 1970s, but the  PRC was swifter with 
the launch of an open door policy toward foreign direct investment (FDI) in 1978, while 
India did not adopt a major reform package until 1991 (Lardy 2003, Panagariya 2006 
and 2007, Kowalski 2010).  
 
The third notes that freer trade and markets were pivotal to the giants’ export success, 
but that active industrial policies in the PRC played a complementary role in nurturing 
domestic capabilities in consumer electronics and other advanced areas that may not 
have developed in their absence (Amsden 2001, Rodrick 2006). Implicit in this third line 
of thinking is that the absence of any new industrial policies since 1991 may in part 
explain why India lags behind the PRC in advanced manufactured exports.  
 
Fourth, concerns have been expressed that the giants’ recent pursuit of free trade 
agreements (FTAs) may be detrimental to exporting due to the shallow coverage of 
agreements and an Asian “noodle bowl” of overlapping FTAs (Baldwin 2008, Suominen 
2009).  
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This paper explores the link between commercial policies and export performance 
through a comparative analysis of the PRC and India. Commercial policies are narrowly 
defined as international commercial policies that include the spectrum of trade and 
investment policies affecting imports, exports, and FDI. In the context of economic 
reforms, such policies encompass import liberalization, export promotion, real exchange 
rates, FDI policies, and FTAs. The domestic counterpart of commercial policy—notably 
competition policy that prevents and reduces the abuse of monopoly power—is excluded 
due to a lack of recent information. Existing research underlines the complexity of the 
giants’ commercial policy mix and suggests further exploration of four interesting 
questions: (i) have the PRC’s exports outpaced India’s? (ii) what role has liberalization of 
trade and investment regimes played in the giants’ export records? (iii)  is the recent 
emphasis on FTAs detrimental to exports? (iv) what are the emerging commercial policy 
challenges in the post-global financial crisis era?  
 
Building on existing research and using new data, the remainder of the paper tackles 
these questions. Section 2 looks at initial conditions influencing trade and trade 
performance. It examines the giants’ export record by describing the evolution of trade 
flows at the aggregate and sectoral levels (focusing on growth and structural change in 
manufactured and services exports, as well as revealed comparative advantages). 
Section 3 explores the link between shifts in key commercial policies (e.g., import 
liberalization, World Trade Organization [WTO] accession, export promotion, and FDI 
policies) and trade flows. Section 4 examines whether FTAs have been detrimental to 
exporting. It evaluates FTA quality in terms of some simple criteria and provides 
evidence on the use of FTAs at the firm level. Section 5 explores emerging commercial 
policy challenges in the post-global financial crisis era. Section 6 concludes. 
 
 
2.  Initial Conditions and Trade Performance 
 
2.1  Initial Conditions  
 
Initial conditions often shape trade outcomes following economic liberalization. Three 
key initial conditions in both countries laid the foundation for subsequent trade patterns 
and performances following economic liberalization in the late 1970s.  
 
One is that geographical proximity to a major developed economy can have spillover 
effects on it neighbors. The PRC’s strategic location in East Asia and shared history with 
its neighbors meant that it was well placed to attract export-oriented manufacturing FDI 
from Japan, the Republic of Korea, and economies form the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN). Geographical proximity, along with low-cost labor and large 
market size, may have also influenced the relocation of production networks and supply 
chains from ASEAN economies to the PRC. India is less well-placed geographically to 
attract FDI from East Asia, but is closer to Europe than the PRC and enjoys closer ties 
due to its legacy of British rule.  
 
The second are the large and growing domestic markets that create a competitive 
advantage for any product with substantial economies of scale (e.g., automobiles,  
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electronics assembly) and lower barriers to entry. So how large are the Chinese and 
Indian markets? It is estimated that industrial producers in the PRC face a potential 
market of about $1 trillion, while India’s industrial producers face a potential market that 
is one-quarter to one-third of the PRC’s size (Yusuf, Nabeshima, and Perkins 2007).  
 
Third is an ample supply of low-cost, productive manpower to attract FDI and provide the 
basis for a comparative advantage in low technology, labor-intensive exports. Various 
competitiveness studies have suggested that the PRC’s labor productivity is higher than 
India’s and that this advantage underlies the PRC’s entry into labor-intensive 
manufactures (World Economic Forum 2010). Meanwhile, the roots of India’s relative 
success in information technology (IT) and business process outsourcing lie in other 
factors, including its exposure to English and a long period of British colonial rule; the 
establishment of Indian Institutes of Technology that provide a base of world class IT 
professionals and engineers; close links with a diaspora of professionals and business 
people who provided relevant contacts, information, and capital; and falling 
telecommunications costs that made it profitable to outsource services (Yusuf, 
Nabeshima, and Perkins 2007; Kowalski 2010).  
 
2.1.1  Overall Trade Performance 
 
To trace the link between economic liberalization and trade performance in the giants, 
Table 1 shows the expansion of aggregate exports and imports of goods and services 
between 1978 and 2009. The data are from the World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators and the indicators are presented as a share of gross domestic product (GDP) 
and world trade. The ratios of exports and imports to GDP are often used as proxies for 
openness, although the latter also reflects the availability of foreign exchange. Using 
comparable WTO trade data for 2010, estimates for 2010 are also provided. Several 
noteworthy points are explained below. 
 
First, the PRC’s earlier and swifter adoption of trade liberalization is highlighted by a 
comparison between its ratio of exports of goods and services to GDP, and ratio of 
imports of goods and services to GDP, with India’s comparable ratios. In 1978, the PRC 
and India were at similar low levels of openness—both had exports- and imports-to-GDP 
ratios of 6%–7%—reflecting a history of restrictive trade regimes and state control. With 
increasing trade liberalization in the PRC, its ratios of exports and imports to GDP more 
than doubled between 1978 and 1991, while India’s ratios showed little change. In the 
aftermath of India’s 1991 liberalization, a modest increase in its openness occurred 
between 1991 and 1998, and a significant increase took place between 1998 and 2008. 
The PRC maintained its openness throughout the 1990s and also saw a rise in exports- 
and imports-to-GDP ratios between 1998 and 2008. By 2008, in terms of exports (goods 
and services), the PRC was considerably more open than India, but there was little 
difference in terms of their imports-to-GDP ratios. The PRC’s ratio of exports to GDP 
was 36.6% in 2008, compared with 22.7% for India. Yet, the ratios of imports to GDP in 
2008 were much more similar to each other, with 28.5% for the PRC and 28.0% for 
India. Thus, the PRC was relatively more open than India over several decades, but the 
latter has made considerable progress, particularly since the late 1990s.  
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Second, as the PRC’s GDP has expanded faster than India’s since the 1970s, the trade-
to-GDP ratios understate the spectacular growth of the PRC’s trade. The respective 
dollar values of exports and shares of world exports give a better picture of the 
difference in export performance between the two giants. In 1978, the two giants had 
about the same level of exports of goods and services, as well as similar world shares of 
exports: the PRC exported $9.8 billion worth of goods and services, compared with $8.6 
billion for India. These figures were both equivalent to about 0.6% of world exports of 
goods and services. By 2008, the PRC’s exports of goods and services reached a 
staggering $1.6 trillion, or 8.0% of world exports. The comparable figures for India were 
$263 billion and 1.3%.  
 
Third, the giants’ trade was relatively resilient in the wake of the global financial crisis. 
Following the crisis, exports of goods and services in the PRC fell to $1.3 trillion in 2009 
while India’s exports increased slightly to $270 billion. In 2010, both experienced a sharp 
rebound in exports of goods and services, which rose to $1.7 trillion in the PRC and 
$326 billion in India. Interestingly, these levels were in excess of pre-crisis levels in both 
countries, underscoring the importance of large dynamic domestic markets, competitive 
export capabilities, and the growing importance of South–South trade cooperation 
(Wignaraja and Lazaro 2010).  
 
Fourth, as developed countries experienced a greater fall in exports than the giants 
during the global financial crisis and a sluggish response thereafter, the world export 
shares of the PRC and India rose to 11.8% and 2.2%, respectively. According to the 
WTO, the PRC’s 2010 share of global exports placed it among the leading exporters in 
the world. The United States (US) was the world’s largest exporter in 2010 with a 12.1% 
global share. The PRC (11.8%) is next, followed by Germany (10.1%) and Japan 
(6.1%).
1 The PRC is also the leading exporter among the so-called club of large “BRIC” 
nations, which also includes Brazil (1.6%), the Russian Federation (3.0%), and India 
(2.2%). In 2010, the ratio of exports of goods and services to GDP rose to 31.8% for the 
PRC and 22.9% for India. A similar rise was visible in their respective imports-to-GDP 
ratios.  
 
2.1.2  Growth of Manufactures and Services 
 
The PRC’s exceptional export performance since 1978 has been driven primarily by the 
production of manufactures for export. As Table 2 shows, the PRC’s manufactured 
export growth rate of 26.7% (current US dollars) in 1995–2008 was nearly twice as fast 
as India’s growth rate of 15.4%. Even more striking perhaps, the PRC increased its 
share of the world’s manufactured exports from 0.5% to 10.8% between 1985 and 2008, 
while India’s share only rose from 0.5% to 1.3% over the same period.  
 
Further differences are visible in the composition of manufactured exports. Table 2 
presents United Nations (UN) Commodity Trade data on manufactured exports for the 
two giants according to a technology-based classification system developed by Lall 
                                                  
1  In 2010, the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) merchandise exports ($1,580 billion) were larger than 
the US ($1,280 billion). But the US is a larger services exporter ($515 billion) than the PRC ($170 
billion). See WTO (2011).  
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(2001). This method distinguishes between resource-based, low-technology, medium-
technology, and high-technology manufactures.  
 
Resource-based products tend to be simple and labor-intensive (e.g., simple food or 
leather processing), although there are segments using capital-, scale-, and skill-
intensive technologies (e.g., petroleum refining or modern processed food). Low-
technology products tend to have stable, well-diffused technologies, primarily embodied 
in capital equipment (e.g., textiles, garments, and footwear). Medium-technology 
products, which consist of the majority of skill- and scale-intensive technologies used in 
capital goods and intermediate products, lie at the core of industrial activity in developed 
countries. High-technology products have advanced and fast-changing technologies, 
with large R&D investments and a focus on product design (e.g., electronic and electrical 
products, aircraft, precision instruments, and pharmaceuticals). Annual average growth 
rates in manufacturing, shares in manufactured exports, and shares of world exports by 
technological category in 1985–2008 are provided in Table 2. Further detail is provided 
below. 
 
•  Among the PRC’s manufactured exports, high-technology exports grew the fastest 
and resource-based exports the slowest. Meanwhile, India’s medium-technology 
exports grew the fastest and low-technology exports the slowest.  
 
•  Both giants have enjoyed a quickened pace to the technological upgrading of their 
manufactured exports since 1985, but the PRC’s speed of technological 
sophistication has been quite striking. Between 1985 and 2008, the PRC’s share of 
high-technology exports in its total manufactures increased more than five times to 
reach 27.7% in 2008. The PRC’s medium-technology exports also rose by a factor of 
three to reach 37.0%. During the same period, India’s shares of high-technology 
exports and medium-technology exports doubled to 8.3% and 24.9%, respectively. 
Nonetheless, India’s manufactured exports are typically concentrated at the lower 
end of the technology spectrum, with resource-based products accounting for one-
third of manufactures and low-technology products accounting for another third.  
 
•  The PRC has dominated world markets in low-technology products for well over a 
decade and in 2008 it accounted for 18.1% of the world’s low-technology exports. It 
also accounts for 10.3% of the world’s medium-technology exports and 14.3% of 
high-technology exports. This is why the PRC is viewed by many developing 
countries as the main competitive threat across the technological spectrum (Lall 
2001). It is also seen as an outlier in terms of the sophistication of its exports: “its 
export bundle is that of a country with an income per capita level three times higher 
than [the PRC’s]” (Rodrick 2006, p.4). Meanwhile, India accounts for less than 1% of 
the world’s medium-technology and high-technology exports, and is perceived as 
less of a competitive threat in the developing world. Even more revealing about 
India’s manufacturing capability is that it has a limited global presence in low-
technology exports (2.5% in 2008) and resource-based exports (1.7% in 2008).  
 
India’s recent export expansion has been led by services rather than manufacturing. 
India has likewise kept pace with the PRC in services export growth. A profile of India 
and the PRC’s services exports during 1985–2008 is shown in Table 3, including growth  
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in services exports (current US dollars), the composition of services exports by broad 
categories, and world market shares. India’s services export grew 16.1% per year 
compared with 18.6% in the PRC during 1985–2008. In 1985, both giants were relatively 
small players in global services exports, with less than 1% shares each. By 2008, these 
shares had risen to 2.7% in India and 3.8% in the PRC. These figures may mask what 
India has typically excelled in: more sophisticated, skill-intensive services exports. India 
has done better in IT and business process outsourcing, as well as insurance and 
financial services. In 2008, India accounted for 4.7% of world IT and business 
processing outsourcing exports, compared with 4.1% for the PRC. Similarly, India 
accounted for 1.9% of world insurance and financial services exports, while the PRC’s 
share was 0.6%.  
 
2.1.3  Revealed Comparative Advantage 
 
The revealed comparative advantage (RCA) index shows the specific sectors in which 
the PRC and India are gaining or losing advantage internationally. Following Balassa 
(1977), the RCA index is expressed as the share of a country's exports in world trade of 
sector j divided by that country's share of world trade in manufactures: 
 
RCAij = (Xij  / Xwj )/(Xim /Xwm)         
 (1) 
 
where  Xij = sectoral exports from the country 
  Xwj  = sectoral exports from the world 
  Xim = total manufactured exports from the country 
  Xwm = total manufactured exports from the world 
 
Assuming that the commodity pattern of trade reflects inter-country differences in relative 
costs and no-price factors, this measure shows the comparative advantage of trading 
countries. The RCA index has a simple interpretation. An RCAij >1 means that the 
sector has a larger share in world trade than the country's total manufactures and that 
the country has an RCA in that sector.  
 
Batra and Khan (2005) have conducted one of the most comprehensive studies of 
sector-level revealed RCA for goods exports on the PRC and India since the switch in 
commercial policies. Using the Balassa RCA index, they find that at the 2-digit HS level 
both countries have a comparable number of sectors (47 in the PRC and 41 in India) 
with an RCA in 2000–2003. They also report similarities in the pattern of specialization in 
primary products, resource-based manufactures, and labor-intensive manufactures in 
the PRC and India. However, important differences emerge in science-and-technology-
intensive sectors. While India and the PRC are advantageously placed in the same 
commodity sectors with respect to science-based manufactures, “in absolute terms the 
PRC’s science based industries are almost double the number of India” (Batra and Khan 
2005, p. 49).  
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How has the pattern of RCA changed over time? Tables 4 and 5 show RCA indices for 
the PRC and India in 2009 at the 2-digit level of the HS classification. These were 
calculated using export data from the World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) database. 
RCA estimates for goods exports in 2000 from Batra and Khan (2005) are also shown. 
Unfortunately, RCA indices for services exports are not available from WITS. Some 
comparisons are as follows.  
 
The evidence suggests that the PRC’s comparative advantage at the sector-level 
appears more robust than India’s. The number of sectors with an RCA in both countries 
was approximately the same between 2000 and 2009. But in 2009, the PRC still had 
more sectors with an RCA than India and more visible relative strength in manufactured 
exports, particularly medium- and high-technology products. Out of 97 sectors at the HS 
2-digit level in 2009, the PRC had 44 sectors with an RCA index above one while India 
had 37.  
 
Low-technology manufactured products dominate the PRC’s top 10 sectors according to 
RCA indices. Manufactures of plaiting material (HS 46) and umbrellas, walking sticks, 
and seat sticks (HS 66) are the two highest ranked RCA sectors in the PRC. Also 
prominent in the PRC are artificial flowers, human hair headgear, textiles, apparel, 
footwear, and leather articles. In contrast, India’s top 10 RCAs comprise a mix of primary 
products, resource-based manufactures, and some low-technology manufactures. 
India’s top two sectors are peals, precious stones, metals, and coins (HS 71) and silk 
(HS 50). These are followed by carpets, other textile flooring, cotton, lac, gums, 
vegetable textile fibers, paper yarn, woven fabric, ores, slag, ash, vegetable plaiting 
materials, vegetable products, other textiles, bird skin, and feathers.  
 
Furthermore, as indicated above, there has been a growing divergence between the 
giants in medium- and high-technology products since 2000 with respect to 
specialization as well as in absolute terms. Several examples tell the story. Crucial high-
technology manufactured products like electrical and electronics products (HS 85) 
jumped from 43rd to 25th in the PRC’s RCA rankings between 2000 and 2009, but is not 
visible in India’s list of 37 products with an RCA of more than one. In addition, the PRC 
had an impressive world market share of 18.4% in electrical and electronics products in 
2009. Another example is ships, boats, and floating structures (a medium-technology 
product). These were ranked 23rd and 22nd in their respective RCA lists. However, the 
PRC had one-fifth of the world market in ships, boats, and floating structures, while India 
had only 2.6%. Similar tales are visible in other medium- and high-technology products 
including machinery, nuclear reactors, boilers, explosives, pyrotechnics, iron, and steel. 
Interestingly, the PRC’s RCA ranking for railway products and equipment slipped from 
11th to 43rd between 2000 and 2009, but it retains a 11.2% world market share. India 
enjoys some success in organic chemicals which increased from 31 to 27 with a world 
market share of 2.4%.  
 
Thus, the giants differ considerably in their trade performances. The PRC has surged 
ahead of India in world export markets, with the PRC’s volume of exports of goods and 
services now over five times larger than India’s. The PRC’s success is linked to the rise 
of manufactured exports, which have been upgraded technologically over time, and the 
expansion of some services. Strong RCAs in a host of medium- and high-technology  
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manufactured sectors are visible in the PRC. Meanwhile, India has done better in skill-
intensive services than manufactures. Compared with developed countries, the giants’ 
export performances have been relatively resilient since the global financial crisis. While 
each country’s initial conditions were influential, they cannot account for the entire story 
of exports from the PRC and India. Commercial policies have also played a major role in 
facilitating specialization and trade. 
 
 
3.  Shifting Commercial Policies and Exports 
 
A central question concerns the role that the liberalization of trade and investment 
regimes has played in the giants’ export records. This section focuses on key 
commercial policies—import liberalization, export promotion measures, and FDI 
policies—at the heart of the PRC and India’s reforms. The giants are each considered 
separately below, followed by some comparisons of their commercial policies and export 
outcomes. Table 6 provides an overview of commercial policies, including their features 
and the timing of implementation.  
 
3.1 The  People’s Republic of China’s Commercial Policies 
 
3.1.1 Inward-Oriented  Strategy 
 
The PRC initiated reforms in 1978 to shift to a more open market-oriented economy. The 
previous inward-oriented centrally-planned strategy had caused multiple economic 
distortions that hampered exports and private sector activity. The inward-oriented 
strategy introduced in the 1950s fostered import-substituting industrialization using 
stringent protections and state control of resource allocation. During the Maoist period, 
private sector firms, including foreign-owned firms, were gradually taken over and private 
sector ownership was completely eliminated in 1958 during the Great Leap Forward. 
Instead, state-owned enterprises emerged at the forefront of the country’s 
industrialization effort. A formal state-owned enterprise sector made up of large firms 
and a proletarian elite of workers with job security and generous welfare benefits co-
existed with less-capitalized, small-scale industrial enterprises based mainly in rural 
areas where workers enjoyed less security and benefits (Maddison 2007).  
 
Some of the economic distortions that arose from the PRC’s inward-oriented strategy 
are listed below.  
 
(i) Stringent quantitative restrictions and other import controls led to a bias towards 
inefficient capital intensive production by large, state-owned enterprises. 
 
(ii) The exchange rate was fixed at an overvalued level to implicitly subsidize the import 
of high-priority capital goods that could not be produced domestically. A rigid system of 
exchange control also existed whereby exporters surrendered all their foreign exchange 
to the state. 
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(iii) FDI and technology transfer were shut out by tight controls on the entry of foreign 
enterprises, resulting in technological obsolesce relative to global best practices. 
 
(iv) Virtually all commodity trade was determined by central planning primarily to ensure 
that state-owned enterprises could obtain cheap imports of capital goods and 
intermediates. A handful of foreign trade cooperatives, all of which were owned and 
controlled by the Ministry of Foreign Trade, was responsible for carrying out the trade 
plan. Each of the foreign trade cooperatives dealt with a limited range of commodities for 
which it was the sole trading company.  
 
Not surprisingly, owing to these inefficiencies and distortions, the PRC witnessed 
lackluster export performance during much of the inward-oriented, centrally-planned era. 
By 1978, the volume of its exports of goods and services had stagnated at less than $10 
billion, which was 0.6% of world exports of goods and services. The composition of 
exports was dominated by primary products, resource-based manufactures, and some 
low-technology manufactures. The time was ripe for a change in commercial policies 
toward export promotion and the private sector. 
 
3.1.2  Open Door Foreign Direct Investment Policy and Other Reforms 
 
The post-1978 reforms marked the start of a gradual and highly coordinated transition 
process in the PRC over the next 3 decades. The initial focus of reforms was to promote 
exports by attracting FDI. In 1979, an export processing law was passed that provided 
incentives for the processing and assembly of imported inputs. These incentives were 
expanded in 1987 to provide for the duty-free import of all raw materials, parts, and 
components used in export production. Monopoly state trading was liberalized starting in 
the late 1970s and replaced with a complex and highly restrictive set of tariffs, non-tariff 
barriers, and licenses. Reform of the complex import control regime was more cautious 
during the early transition years, but was strengthened from 1992 onward by extensive 
reforms that the PRC agreed to implement as a part of the WTO accession process. 
Accordingly, a dualistic trade regime existed from the mid-1980s onward that promoted 
exports via FDI alongside controlled liberalization of protected domestic sectors 
(Kowalski 2010).  
 
To attract export-oriented FDI, the PRC implemented five main measures beginning in 
the late 1970s (Zhang 2009):  
 
(i) the easing of regulations governing the entry and operation of foreign enterprises 
through a series of laws, notably the Sino–Foreign Equity Joint Venture Law of 1979, 
Sino–Foreign Cooperative Joint Venture Law of 1986, and the Wholly Foreign Owned 
Enterprise Law of 1988 to encourage the formation of joint ventures between foreign and 
local investors, technology transfers to local partners, and domestic sourcing of inputs; in 
later years, measures were introduced to facilitate the operation of wholly owned foreign 
enterprises;  
 
(ii) providing efficient, cost-competitive infrastructure for export processing commencing 
with four special economic zones (SEZs) along the PRC’s southern coast to enable  
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foreign producers to operate with good infrastructure and a minimum of undue 
interference; 
 
(iii) introducing a complex system of tax incentives (including a 15% corporate tax rate, 
exemptions, and refunds) and facilitating the financing to channel FDI toward SEZs; 
 
(iv) formalizing a duty drawback system beginning in 1987 to ensure duty-free access to 
all imported raw materials, parts, and components for export processing; and  
 
(v) applying liberal labor regulations in the SEZs to ensure relatively low wages for an 
ample supply of skilled workers. 
 
Two other policies were vital to export growth, especially among domestic enterprises 
(Lardy 2003). First, there was the liberalization of the system of export licensing and 
quotas. Only 8% of exports were subject to export licensing and quotas by 1999, 
compared with a peak of about 66% in 1991.  
 
Second, reforms of the foreign exchange system were initiated starting with unification of 
dual exchange rates in 1994 (Hu 2010). As a significant incentive for exporting, 
exporters were allowed to retain a share of their foreign exchange earnings, which 
enabled them to finance imports without needing to seek official permission. Over time, 
the state also devalued the domestic currency and in 1997 moved toward currency 
convertibility on current account transactions, making it even easier for exporters to 
obtain foreign currency. In 2005, the PRC moved more systematically towards a 
managed floating exchange rate regime based on market supply and demand with 
reference to a basket of currencies.  
 
Despite the various measures to attract FDI and promote exports, FDI flows into the 
PRC were modest in the first decade or so of reforms. As Table 7 shows, annual 
average FDI inflows amounted to $1.6 billion a year during 1978–1990 and were largely 
destined for the four SEZs. From the early 1990s onward, however, the PRC attracted 
record levels of FDI with inflows amounting to $54.0 billion per year during 1991–2010. 
Annual FDI inflows in 2003–2010 of $81.5 billion were more than double that during 
1991–2002. Cumulative FDI flows into the PRC reached an impressive $1,098.7 billion 
during 1978–2010. As a result, the PRC became the world’s second largest FDI 
recipient after the US. Interestingly, the global financial crisis did not significantly disrupt 
FDI inflows, which dropped modestly from a peak of $108.3  billion in 2008 to $95.0 
billion in 2009. FDI inflows subsequently rebounded to pre-crisis levels of $105.7 billion 
in 2010.  
 
A strong regional element is visible in the host country origin of the PRC’s FDI inflows. 
Much of the surge in FDI inflows into the PRC since the 1990s came from overseas 
Chinese investors—primarily based in Hong Kong, China; Taipei,China; and Macao, 
China—who collectively accounted for 42.0% of cumulative FDI inflows during 1997–
2006 (Zhang 2009). Another 21.2% came from other East Asian countries—primarily 
Japan, the Republic of Korea, and ASEAN members. Meanwhile, among non-regional 
countries, the US accounted for 7.8% of FDI and the European Union (EU) comprised 
8.6%. Interestingly, the share of overseas Chinese investors rose significantly to 56.9%  
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in 2008. Meanwhile, the shares of other East Asian countries (17.3%), the EU (6.7%), 
and the US (6.4%) all declined somewhat.
2   
 
FDI had a dramatic impact on the PRC’s exports. The share of foreign enterprises 
accounting for PRC exports increased from 32% to 58% between 1995 and 2005, before 
declining slightly to 54% in 2010.
3  FDI inflows have been fundamental to the PRC’s 
success in manufactured exports by linking the country into production networks in key 
industries. FDI brought not only capital, but more importantly, access to marketing 
channels, world class technologies, and organizational methods. In the early years of 
reforms, FDI was central to the rise of low-technology, labor-intensive exports like 
textiles, garments, and footwear. Subsequently, the surge in FDI in the 1990s drove the 
rapid technological upgrading from manufactures into more complex activities like 
electronics and automotives.
4 The PRC used policies to facilitate technology upgrading 
and domestic technological development. Entry and operational regulations for foreign 
firms required them to form joint ventures with domestic firms, promote technology 
transfer to their local partners, and source inputs locally (Rodrick 2006). Furthermore, 
the PRC also invested heavily in R&D, scientists, and engineers to absorb imported 
technologies. Its R&D-expenditure-to-GDP ratio more than doubled from 0.6% to 1.5% 
between 1996 and 2007 (Table 11). The number of R&E researchers per million also 
doubled from 448 to 1,071 during this period.  
 
More recently, the PRC has become a notable outward investor in the world economy 
(Table 7). During 1995–2005, annual outward FDI from the PRC was relatively small at 
$3.8 billion per year. Such flows increased more than five times to about $22 billion in 
2006 and 2007, and peaked at $52.2 billion in 2008 on the eve of the global financial 
crisis. Following the global financial crisis, there was a modest drop in the PRC’s 
outward investment to about $48 billion in 2009. The bulk of outward FDI has been in the 
primary and tertiary sectors, with relatively little going into manufacturing (Davies 2010). 
Most has gone to countries in Asia, but FDI from the PRC is now spreading throughout 
the world. In part, the growth of outward FDI reflects a combination of large export 
surpluses; rising wages; a global search for commodities to fuel industrialization; and the 
emergence of large, home-grown multinational corporations looking for overseas 
investment opportunities.  
 
The liberalization of import controls began slowly and cautiously in the PRC from the 
early 1980s onward.
5 Two parallel stages in import liberalization can be identified that 
led to significant cuts in overall import protection over time. First, to move away from the 
direct planning of all trade, a simplified system of import quotas and licensing was 
adopted in the early 1980s, and the number of products under import controls was 
                                                  
2 www.fdi.gov.cn 
3  1995 and 2005 figures are taken from Anantaram and Saquib (2010) while the 2010 (January to 
August) data are from www.fdi.gov.cn.  
4  For recent micro-level level studies of the relationship between imported technology (via FDI and 
foreign buyers) and innovation, and learning in Chinese manufacturing (e.g. electronics, automotives, 
and textiles), see Wignaraja (2008 and 2011). The evidence indicates that the impressive use of 
imported technologies efficiently underlies the PRC’s export success.  
5  Zhang et al (1998) evaluated the structure of trade protection in the PRC and present estimates of 
static costs. They suggest that trade liberalization would lead to short-term costs in terms of lost 
domestic output and employment, but estimate long-run benefits to be in the range of about $35 billion.   
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reduced. The share of imports under quotas and licensing fell from 46% to 18% between 
the late 1980s and 1992, and still further to about 9% in 1997 (Lardy 2002, p. 39). 
Second, more transparent price-based instruments—import tariffs—were introduced in 
the early 1980s to replace quotas and licenses, and tariff reduction subsequently 
commenced. In 1985, a new customs regulation was passed that rationalized the tariff 
schedule. More notable tariff cuts occurred following the adoption of a socialist market 
economy in 1992.  
 
The process of tariff reduction was also facilitated by the significant reforms that the 
country agreed to implement as a part of its accession to the WTO in 2001. Achieved 
after 14 years of difficult negotiations with General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT)/WTO members, which resulted in the PRC agreeing to significant reductions in 
agricultural tariffs, the PRC’s WTO membership was hailed as a major milestone in the 
development of its economy and the multilateral trading system. WTO membership is 
considered to have brought numerous benefits such as deepened integration of the PRC 
with the global economy, increased trade and investment, and easier dispute settlement 
via a rules-based international trading system.  
 
The PRC has generally followed through on its liberalization commitments made during 
WTO accession. The available tariff data indicate an overall move toward a more open 
and transparent import regime. Simple average import tariffs on all imports fell modestly 
from 55.6% to 43.2% between 1982 and 1992 (Lardy 2002, p. 34). Thereafter, the pace 
of tariff reform accelerated. Table 8 provides data from the WTO Integrated Database 
and the WTO Tariff Profiles on simple, average-applied, most favored nation (MFN) 
tariffs for agricultural products, non-agricultural products, and both agricultural and non-
agricultural products between 1996 and 2009. Average import tariffs fell to 23.7% in 
1996 and still further to 15.9% on the eve of WTO accession in 2001. The continuing 
process of tariff reduction resulted in average import tariffs of 9.6% by 2009. 
Accordingly, the PRC became one of the more open economies in the developing world. 
Non-agricultural products typically enjoyed less tariff protection than agricultural products 
and have experienced a swifter speed of tariff reduction. In 1996, average import tariffs 
for non-agricultural products (22.8%) were significantly lower than those for agricultural 
products (34.1%). By 2009, import tariffs for non-agricultural products had declined to 
8.7% and those for agricultural products were 15.6%.  
 
Table 9 provides the latest data on MFN applied tariffs and imports by product group for 
2009. There is relatively little dispersion in import tariffs for non-agricultural products, 
which range from 4.4% for wood and paper to 16.0% for clothing. Within this general 
picture, major high-technology products have lower tariffs than less dynamic, low-
technology products. Thus, import tariffs for electrical machinery, non-electrical 
machinery, and transport equipment are 8.0%, 7.8%, and 11.5%, respectively. This 
compares with import tariffs of 16.0% for clothing and 13.4% for leather and footwear. In 
contrast, a wider import tariff band applies to agricultural products ranging from 10.6% 
for oilseeds, fats, and oils to 27.4% for sugars and confectionary.  
 
However, some have expressed concerns that the PRC’s WTO accession has resulted 
in more challenges for the PRC, its trading partners, and the WTO itself. There are 
questions over whether more trade disputes have arisen since the PRC’s accession and  
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if the WTO’s relatively new dispute settlement mechanism has been over-stretched. 
Recent research (Bowen  2010) reports some interesting findings. Before 2001, 
exporters in the PRC were more likely to face antidumping charges than exporters from 
other countries. After 2001, there seems to be an increase in antidumping investigations 
against PRC exports by, for example, both the US and EU. The PRC invested 
significantly in learning about the WTO dispute settlement mechanism and preparing to 
become active in responding to cases against it as well in initiating cases against trading 
partners. Subsequently, the PRC appears to have become a leading user of 
antidumping investigations, which in some cases are possibly associated with industries 
that had the biggest reductions in tariffs during WTO accession. Nonetheless, the risk of 
overwhelming the capacity of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism has not 
materialized.  
 
Exchange rate management has assumed more significance to Chinese exporters since 
the turn of the millennium. In essence, the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) has pursued 
a managed floating exchange regime whereby the renminbi exchange rate is based on 
the supply and demand of the market, and adjusted with reference to a basket of 
currencies (Hu 2010). A key policy objective of the PBOC is to maintain a relatively 
stable and predictable nominal exchange rate. A standard measure of international 
competitiveness is the real effective exchange rate (REER)—the weighted average of a 
country's currency relative to an index or basket of other major currencies adjusted for 
the effects of inflation. Figure 1 charts monthly Bank of International Settlements (BIS) 
data on the REER for the PRC from January 2000 to January 2011. The base year for 
the REER series is 2005. The REER exhibited a U-shaped pattern during this period. 
After a short initial appreciation between January 2000 and April  2002, the REER 
remained depreciated between May 2002 and December 2007. Thereafter, the REER 
behaved somewhat erratically, with an appreciating tendency. Thus, for much of the past 
decade, the PRC’s inflation has been below that of its trading partners and the rate of 
nominal exchange depreciation was sufficient to offset this inflation differential.  
 
 
3.2  India’s Commercial Policies 
 
3.2.1 Inward-Oriented  Strategy 
 
The start of import substitution in India in the late 1950s introduced policy interventions 
on trade that evolved into one of the most highly protected and inward-oriented regimes 
in the developing world. The regime continued, with some minor changes, into the 
1980s. Popular discourse often equates India’s commercial policy reforms with the post-
1991 period. Partial reforms, however, were attempted in the previous decade. 
Accordingly, three phases can be identified in the history of India’s commercial policies 
(Panagariya 2004): (i) inward-oriented, state-controlled policies (1950–1975); (ii) partial 
liberalization (1976–1991), particularly since the mid-1980s; and (iii) major reforms from 
1991 onward.  
 
During phases (i) and (ii), balance of payment pressures in the 1950s led to 
comprehensive import controls to conserve foreign exchange. Such controls rapidly 
evolved into an explicit strategy to promote import-substituting industrialization behind  
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high and variable levels of import protection backed by central planning to allocate 
resources. A self-interested bureaucracy, famously dubbed the “License Raj” by 
Bhagwati and Desai (1970), implemented a plethora of controls and restrictions on 
private sector expansion and exporting. A strict and cumbersome system of licensing 
and quotas was applied to the import of capital goods, consumer goods, and other 
inputs. To this formidable battery of trade and investment controls were added policies to 
foster indigenous technology. Controls were applied at various stages to access foreign 
technology in the form of FDI and licensing agreements. For instance, under the Foreign 
Exchange Regulations Act of 1973, foreign ownership beyond 40% equity was usually 
not permitted. For licensing, the government imposed strict controls on payments 
permitted and life of the contract. Shielded from competition, a handful of large private 
firms and state-owned enterprises occupied monopoly positions in major industrial and 
service sectors.  
 
There were attempts at partial liberalization of imports and exports in phase (ii). In 1979, 
India introduced an Open General Licensing list that permitted limited imports of 
machinery and raw materials not produced domestically. In the mid-1980s, a few new 
measures to promote exports were undertaken, including a passbook scheme for duty-
free imports for exporters and the setting of the exchange rate at a more realistic level. 
Partial liberalization contributed to India’s export development in the second half of the 
1980s. Albeit from a low base, India’s exports of goods and services rose modestly from 
$8.6 billion to $12.2 billion between 1978 and 1985. India’s share of world exports of 
goods and services, however, fell from 0.6% to 0.5% during the same period. The 
hallmark of the trade and investment regime during phases (i) and (ii) was an anti-export 
bias that held back export growth and diversification. Tight controls on technology 
imports meant that there was only a trickle of FDI inflows and few technology licenses 
were granted. Over-protection resulted in technological obsolesce and Indian industry 
rapidly fell behind world technology frontiers (Lall 1987).
6 Largely shut out from external 
markets and technology transfers, India’s economy grew unremarkably at the so-called 
“Hindu rate” of 3.5% per year during the period 1950–1980.
7  
 
3.2.2 Economic  Reforms 
 
In phase (iii), reforms to India’s import-substituting industrializing strategy were 
undertaken from the 1990s onward. A package of trade and investment reforms were 
introduced in 1991 and followed by deeper reforms over time, leading to four key 
changes.  
 
                                                  
6  Lall’s pioneering study of the acquisition of technological capabilities in Indian industry during the early 
1980s concludes “…even the leading enterprises find themselves unable to undertake the 
development of major new products and process technologies. More interestingly, they find it difficult to 
copy many new advances in product technology (for sophisticated new equipment, for instance) on 
their own” (Lall, 1987, p. 238).  
7   “Hindu rate” refers to India’s low annual average growth rates of about 3.5% during the period of 
inward-oriented economic and commercial policies lasting from the 1950s until 1991. The term was 
first coined by Indian economist Raj Krishna and has since been used by other economists including 
Meghnard Desai and Deepak Lall.   
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First, in a sweeping liberalization on the trade front, import licensing on machinery and 
raw materials was abolished in 1991. Licensing on consumer goods was abolished in 
2001. This meant that import tariffs became the main protective instrument after 1991.  
 
Second, a gradual reduction in the dispersion of high and variable import tariffs, which 
had risen significantly in the 1980s, also began in 1991. Tariff reform focused on a 
gradual compression of the top tariff rates, with simultaneous rationalization of the tariff 
structure via a reduction in the number of tariff bands.  
 
Third, a depreciated exchange rate was maintained to boost export competitiveness and 
better access to foreign exchange for exporting. The dual exchange rate was unified and 
current account convertibility commenced in 1994 in line with International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) Article VII obligations.  
 
Fourth, restrictions on foreign ownership were gradually liberalized. A system of 
automatic clearance for FDI proposals fulfilling various conditions (e.g., ownership levels 
of 50%, 51%, 74%, and 100%) was adopted and new sectors (e.g., mining, banking, 
telecommunications, and various services) were opened up to foreign ownership. 
Subsequently, 100% foreign ownership was permitted in manufacturing with some 
exceptions, such as defense-related sectors. In 2005, a Special Economic Zones Act 
was passed to promote exports from both foreign and local enterprises more 
systematically.  
 
The post-1991 reforms had a significant impact on India’s profile as an international 
investment destination. Between 1978–1990 and 1991–2010, average annual FDI 
inflows increased from a tiny $100 million to an unprecedented $9.5 billion (Table 7). 
The annual averages mask the fact that most of the increase in FDI inflows took place in 
the second decade after the 1991 reforms, indicating a notable lag between the 
enactment of policy reforms and major FDI inflows. Annual average FDI inflows rose 
from $2.5 billion to $20 billion between 1991–2002 and 2003–2010, with inflows peaking 
at $41.6 billion in 2008. But the global financial crisis exerted a significant negative effect 
on inward investment and FDI inflows fell from this peak level to $34.6 billion in 2009 
and remained depressed at $21.0 billion in 2010. Cumulative FDI inflows amounted to 
$191.3 billion in 1978–2010, with $155.3 billion of inflows in the 1991–2010 period.    
 
The attraction of significant FDI inflows into India is a major achievement of the 1991 
reforms. The post-2003 surge in FDI flows is particularly encouraging and the figures for 
2008 and 2009 were starting to match FDI inflows into the PRC in the 1990s. 
Nonetheless, cumulative FDI inflows are below the levels experienced by the PRC and 
other high-performing East Asian economies. For instance, cumulative FDI inflows into 
India during 1978–2010 are only one-sixth of the PRC’s in the same period.  
 
The entry of FDI into India brought new technologies, skills, and marketing connections, 
and began the process of making Indian manufacturing more internationally competitive. 
Thus far, India has yet to emulate East Asia’s example in fully exploiting the potential for 
export-oriented FDI inflows into manufacturing. FDI into Indian manufacturing has largely 
focused on serving the large domestic market rather than exports. It is estimated that the 
share of multinational enterprises in India’s exports is small at less than 10%, compared  
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with 54% in the PRC (Kumar and Sharma 2009, p. 37; www.fdi.gov.cn). Following a 
focus on domestic manufacturing, FDI flows have increasingly shifted toward services—
particularly IT services and financial services. The US is the single largest source of FDI 
in India after Mauritius, making up about 16% of total FDI inflows during 1991–2006 
(Kumar and Sharma 2009, p. 39). East Asian economies account for another 14% and 
EU countries comprise 24%.   
 
Another aspect of India’s post-1991 FDI reform story is the emergence of outward 
investment. India had limited outward investment in the first decade and a half of reform, 
but has seen a marked increase thereafter. India’s average annual outward FDI 
increased from a relatively small base of $1.0 billion to $16.7 billion between 1995–2005 
and 2006–2008 (Table 7). There was a fall in outward investment to $14.9 billion in 
2009, however, as a result of the global financial crisis. India’s cumulative outward 
investment amounted to $73.1 billion in 1995–2009, which is equivalent to about 40% of 
the PRC’s during the same period.  
    
Import tariffs, which became the main protective instrument following the abolition of 
licensing, steadily fell during the post-1991 period. On the eve of the 1991 reforms, India 
was reputed to have the highest import tariffs in the developing world, along with 
significant dispersion of import tariffs. In 1991, the simple average of all tariffs was 
113%, with the highest tariff rate at 355% (Panagariya 2004, p. 7). A reduction occurred 
thereafter, with simple average tariffs falling from this peak to 38.7% in 1996 and still 
further to 12.9% in 2009 (Table 8). The main thrust of tariff reduction since 1991 has 
been on non-agricultural products rather than agricultural products. Tariffs on non-
agricultural products fell somewhat modestly from 40.1% to 31.4% between 1996 and 
2001, but the pace of tariff reduction accelerated in recent years with such tariffs falling 
to historic lows of 10.1% in 2008. In contrast, tariffs on primary products actually rose 
from 23.1% to 36.3% between 1996 and 2001, and were subsequently reduced 
somewhat to 31.8% in 2009. In spite of progress in tariff reduction, India’s average 
import tariffs remain higher than the PRC’s. While a narrow gap exists in the averages 
for non-agricultural tariffs, India’s average import tariffs on agricultural products are 
double that of the PRC’s.  
 
The growing gap between agricultural and non-agricultural tariffs in India also raised 
dispersion in tariffs. As Table 9 shows, there is significant dispersion in tariffs for non-
agricultural products, which range from 7.2% for electrical machinery to 29.8% for fish 
and fish products. The dispersion of tariffs is considerably higher, however, for 
agricultural products, ranging from 12.0% for cotton to 70.8% for beverages and 
tobacco. Accordingly, tariff dispersion seems higher in India than in the PRC.  
 
Unification of the dual exchange rate, along with current account convertibility, increased 
the potency of the exchange rate as a trade policy instrument and improved foreign 
exchange availability for exporters. As Figure 1 shows, India maintained a stable and 
predictable REER between January 2000 and May 2005. Since mid-2005, however, the 
REER has tended to behave more erratically with short periods of sharp depreciation 
followed by sharp appreciation. More volatile REER behavior since-2005 reflects 
differences in inflation between India and its major trading partners. Particularly worrying 
is the emergence of an appreciating trend after March 2009 linked to rising inflation in  
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India. Accordingly, the REER supported export activity between 2000 and mid-2005, but 
has provided more mixed signals in recent years. 
 
3.2.3  Comparing Commercial Policies and Export Outcomes 
 
The PRC and India have each pursued distinctive commercial policies to shift to an 
outward-oriented, market-based economy after a long period of following inward-
oriented, centrally-planned models. Contrary to the prevailing orthodoxy that 
emphasized the merits of “big bang” comprehensive reforms as pursued by the former 
Soviet Union during the 1990s, starting in the late 1970s the giants initiated gradual and 
incremental reforms over several decades. The giants’ interest in a gradualist approach 
reflects concerns about the (i) strength of the supply response of the private sector to 
reforms, (ii) long process of creating market institutions, and (iii) social consequences of 
economic adjustments. The PRC and India differ, however, in the process of 
implementing a gradual approach to reforms including timing, speed, stages, and 
specific measures adopted. Accordingly, differences in commercial policies have 
influenced the PRC’s rise as a massive global exporter of manufactures and India’s 
expansion into high-skill services exports alongside manufactures.  
 
The PRC was swifter, more coordinated, and more credible in its overall reform process 
than India. It introduced an open door policy to FDI in 1978, while India’s major FDI 
reforms did not come until 1991. Attracting export-oriented FDI into the manufacturing 
sector became the cornerstone of the PRC’s commercial policies in the early years of 
reform and underlies its success in manufactured exports. The PRC evolved a 
comprehensive FDI policy that enabled it to attract record inflows of export-oriented FDI 
into manufacturing while technologically upgrading the sector over time (via joint 
ventures and by promoting technology transfer). Another FDI spillover has been growing 
outward PRC investment in Asia and the rest of the world. India was slower in adopting 
a comprehensive policy framework for export-oriented FDI. It initially focused on 
liberalizing restrictions on foreign ownership, which is perhaps insufficient in a highly 
competitive international environment for attracting export-oriented FDI. For instance, 
other measures like SEZ legislation only date to 2005. Nonetheless, an improvement in 
India’s investment climate in the second decade of reform (2000s) was accompanied by 
a surge in FDI inflows, particularly into services. If the FDI surge continues, India has the 
potential to become a significant global services hub with a respectable manufacturing 
export base.  
 
Export promotion via FDI took place in the PRC alongside the controlled liberalization of 
a protected domestic sector. The PRC was cautious in reforming its import control 
regime during the early transition years, but the process was strengthened from 1992 
onward by reforms needed to accede to the WTO. Steady progress in tariff reform 
continued and the PRC has emerged as one of the more open economies in the 
developing world. Increased import competition induced increased efficiency, industrial 
restructuring, and exporting in a formerly protected domestic enterprise sector. India 
dramatically abolished import licensing on machinery and raw materials in 1991 and 
tariff reform has resulted in a far more open import regime than ever before. 
Nonetheless, India’s average tariffs and their dispersion still remain higher than the 
PRC’s.   
18     |    Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 83 
   
 
 
In an environment of gradual tariff reform, exchange rate management became a critical 
tool to encourage exporting activity in the giants. The PRC introduced currency 
convertibility on current account transactions, while India unified the dual exchange rate 
and commenced current account convertibility. Having gained improved access to 
foreign exchange, the giants both pursued managed floating exchange rate policies to 
maintain relatively stable and predictable nominal exchange rates. Both also had some 
success in maintaining a favorable REER for exporting activity during the 2000s, but the 
PRC seems to have done somewhat better than India in this regard. 
 
 
4.   Pursuit of Free Trade Agreement-Led Regionalism 
 
In another marked shift in commercial policy since the early 2000s, the giants have both 
pursued a variety of bilateral and regional trade agreements alongside trade 
multilateralism. These moves have promoted some concerns about the possible 
detrimental impact of FTAs on exporting for two reasons. One is the shallow coverage of 
FTAs, which are said to be quite liberalizing when it comes to the goods trade, with the 
exception of agriculture, but quite thin and vague in scope compared with most 
agreements formed in the Americas or across the Pacific (Suominen 2009). Second, 
there is the problem of the so-called Asian “noodle bowl” of FTAs. Informed by Jagdish 
Bhagwati’s (1995) famous insight of a “spaghetti bowl” of FTAs and applied to Asia, the 
noodle bowl description suggests that different tariffs and rules of origin in multiple FTAs 
have resulted in the problem of criss-crossing agreements that are characterized by 
excessive exclusions and special treatment (Baldwin 2008). Quite apart from a potential 
distortion of trade towards bilateral channels, firms may face large administrative 
burdens, such as the need to deal with multiple rules of origin, which results in low rates 
of FTA utilization. Are these concerns valid? 
 
4.1  Motivations for Free Trade Agreements 
 
By April 2011, the giants were among the region’s leaders in FTA activity with 11 FTAs 
in effect each (Table 10). Looking at FTAs under negotiation and proposed FTAs 
suggests that such activity will rise in the future as the PRC has another 13 agreements 
in the pipeline and India another 20. Meanwhile, a relatively limited (goods only) Asia–
Pacific Trade Agreement (APTA) is the only FTA between the PRC and India. 
 
The giants’ interest in FTAs may seem somewhat surprising as India is a founding WTO 
member and the PRC only joined the WTO in 2001. This interest can be attributed to 
three main causes: (i) the expansion of European and North American FTA-led 
regionalism, which highlight large economic gains (e.g., economies of scale, 
specialization, and inward investment) available from integrating fragmented regional 
markets; (ii) the lack of progress in the multilateral WTO Doha Round trade negotiations, 
which has encouraged FTAs to be considered as an alternative means of securing 
market access in goods and services as well as venturing into new trade issues not 
covered by the Doha Round; and (iii) increasing recognition that FTAs are a part of a  
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supporting policy framework for deepening production networks and supply chains 
formed by global multinational corporations and emerging Asian firms.  
8  
 
Reflecting the PRC’s relatively recent FTA experience, it has FTAs with trading partners 
in the developing world—ASEAN members; Hong Kong, China; Taipei,China; Macao, 
China; Pakistan; Chile; and Peru—but only one agreement with a developed economy—
New Zealand. The PRC’s FTA strategy appears driven by economic motivations related 
to its emergence as the global factory though a pivotal role in Asian production networks. 
The PRC views FTAs as supporting the functioning of Asian production networks in 
electronics and automotives, and as a means of gaining preferential market access for 
manufactured exports. To this end, the ASEAN–PRC FTA, which is an important 
building block for an Asia-wide FTA, has effectively created the world’s largest free trade 
zone, facilitating the parts and components trade in ASEAN economies and final 
assembly in the PRC. The agreements with Hong Kong, China; Taipei,China; and 
Macao, China are natural extensions of the free trade zone into the region. The impetus 
for such agreements to reduce trade barriers and costs has come from overseas 
Chinese investors who account for the bulk of inward investment into the PRC. The FTA 
with Pakistan provides initial access to the large and growing South Asian market. The 
FTA with New Zealand provided the PRC with the experience of negotiating 
comprehensive new age FTAs with developed countries, and has attracted FDI and 
technology transfer in the dairy industry. The FTAs with Chile and Peru are beachheads 
into the Latin American market and a means of fostering closer trans-Pacific 
cooperation.  
 
The PRC’s future FTAs consist of a mix of sub-regional and bilateral agreements. 
Prominent among the sub-regional FTAs is the agreement between the PRC, Japan, 
and Republic of Korea, which is critical to the formation of an Asia-wide FTA and the 
deepening of production networks. FTAs with the South African Customs Union and Gulf 
Cooperation Council facilitate access to commodity imports to fuel the PRC’s rapid 
industrialization and to extra-regional markets for its manufactured exports. Unlike in the 
case of India, there is little sign of FTA discussions with the PRC’s major trading 
partners in the developed world—notably the EU and US—which may reflect trading 
partners’ concerns about the impact of the PRC’s highly competitive manufactured 
exports on domestic employment. For the same reason, there has been little movement 
in official FTA discussions with India.  
 
The PRC seems to be experimenting with alternative formats for FTAs in an attempt to 
eventually evolve a template akin to what the US uses for FTA negotiations. In earlier 
FTAs with ASEAN and Chile, the PRC has followed a gradual approach, whereby goods 
were liberalized first, followed by services and investment. A single undertaking, 
however, characterizes more recent bilateral FTAs with New Zealand and Singapore.  
 
With a smaller manufacturing base and the relatively late adoption of trade liberalization, 
India’s initial motivation for concluding FTAs appears to have been different from the 
PRC’s. Motivated by a political commitment to the Non-Aligned Movement, India has 
long supported the expansion of South–South trade though agreements focused on 
                                                  
8  Kawai and Wignaraja (2011).   
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market access for the goods trade. In this vein, it was party to the region’s first 
agreement (APTA) as early as 1976. Following a long period of negotiations, a spate of 
bilateral FTAs followed with smaller South Asian neighbors, including Afghanistan, 
Bhutan, Nepal, and Sri Lanka; a sub-regional South Asian Free Trade Area was created 
in an attempt to access markets in Bangladesh and Pakistan; and bilateral agreements 
were forged with Chile and MERCOSUR. The South–South thrust of India’s FTA 
strategy continues with agreements under negotiation with several Latin American and 
African countries. India’s FTA strategy evolved to encompass major trading partners as 
economic motivations and market access became more prominent after the 1991 
economic reforms.  
 
Recent extensions reflect India’s “Look East” Policy of fostering economic ties with 
economically important East Asia and the needs of its growing services sector to access 
developed countries’ markets. India has put into effect FTAs with ASEAN, Singapore, 
and the Republic of Korea as stepping stones toward an ASEAN+6 FTA comprising 
ASEAN members plus the PRC, India, Japan, Republic of Korea, Australia, and New 
Zealand. In early 2011, India signed FTAs with Japan and Malaysia. It is also engaged in 
active FTA negotiations with several developed countries, including the EU, Australia, 
New Zealand, Canada and the four members of the European Free Trade Association 
(EFTA).
9   Developed country interest in negotiating FTAs with India reflects 
complementarities in factor endowments and trade patterns, as well as a recent surge in 
multinational investment focused on the large domestic Indian market.  
 
4.2  Evaluating Free Trade Agreement Quality  
 
What is the quality of the PRC and India’s existing FTAs in relation to best practices? 
Evaluating FTA quality against best practices is difficult for two reasons. First, it requires 
detailed and often painstaking examination of the legal texts of FTAs. Second, an 
internationally accepted methodology for assessing the quality of FTA provisions against 
best practices is absent. One way forward is to attempt to evaluate the compatibility of 
the PRC and India’s FTAs against existing (or future) global rules. Building on recent 
research, some simple legal and economic evaluation criteria were developed to gauge 
the giants’ FTAs based on tariff elimination on the goods trade, coverage of services 
sectors, and coverage of trade issues beyond goods and services (Plummer 2007, 
Wignaraja and Lazaro 2010). The tariff elimination criteria reflected GATT Article 24. 
FTAs that eliminated tariffs on at least 85% of tariff lines (of either or all FTA partners) 
within 10 years were classed as WTO-compliant. The criteria for services liberalization 
relied on the coverage of sectors included in the General Agreement on Trade in 
Services (GATS). FTAs that covered five key sectors of the GATS were taken as 
“comprehensive,” those with less than five sectors as “partial,” and those without any 
coverage as “no provision.” The four so-called Singapore issues
10 in the context of WTO 
                                                  
9  These are Norway, Switzerland, Iceland and Liechtenstein.  
10  The Singapore issues refer to four working groups set up during the WTO Ministerial Conference of 
1996 in Singapore. These groups were tasked with exploring (i) transparency in government 
procurement, (ii) trade facilitation (customs issues), (iii) trade and investment, and (iv) trade and 
competition. The four Singapore issues were conditionally included in the work program for the Doha 
Development Round global trade talks, but were dropped at the WTO Ministerial Conference in 
Cancun in 2004.   
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negotiations—investment, competition policy, government procurement, and trade 
facilitation—are convenient for examining trade issues beyond goods and services. 
FTAs, which covered all four Singapore issues, were classed as comprehensive and the 
remainder as either partial or no provision.  
 
Table 10 presents the details of the classification system and the results for individual 
FTAs in the PRC and India. Legal texts from the ADB’s FTA database were used for the 
empirical application of these criteria. The results are quite revealing about the quality of 
the PRC and India’s FTAs in terms of existing or future global rules. The key findings are 
given below.  
 
The overall quality of the PRC and India’s trade agreements varies. Of the giants’ 22 
FTAs in effect, 10 are WTO-compliant in goods liberalization, three are comprehensive 
in services coverage, and one is comprehensive in coverage of the Singapore issues. 
The best FTAs are probably the PRC–Singapore FTA, which is WTO-compliant on 
goods and comprehensive in services coverage, and the India–Republic of Korea 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA), which is comprehensive in 
both services coverage and Singapore issues in addition to being WTO-compliant on 
goods.  
 
In terms of goods liberalization, the PRC’s FTAs seem better than India’s. Seven of the 
PRC’s FTAs are WTO-compliant, compared with three for India. Some examples of 
WTO-compliant agreements are useful for highlighting differences in the giants’ 
respective approach to dealing with trade partners. Under the PRC–Singapore FTA, 
95% of the PRC’s tariff lines were eliminated within 1 year. Singapore, of course, has 
virtually zero tariffs for most items and tariff elimination is not considered a major trade 
policy issue. The New Zealand–PRC FTA allows for immediate elimination of 35% of the 
PRC’s tariff lines upon entry into force and 96% within 8 years. The ASEAN–PRC FTA 
allows for longer adjustment periods for LDCs and accordingly eliminates 90% of the 
tariff lines of the PRC and the ASEAN-6 economies within 5 years, while the economies 
of Cambodia, Myanmar, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, and Viet Nam have 10 
years. Meanwhile, the India–Republic of Korea FTA liberalizes 75% of India’s tariff lines 
and 93% of the Republic of Korea’s within 8 years. The India–Singapore FTA 
immediately eliminates tariffs on 80% of the value of India’s imports from Singapore.  
 
The coverage of services also seems better in the PRC’s FTAs than India’s. The PRC–
Singapore FTA allows for comprehensive coverage of services, while another seven of 
the PRC’s FTAs cover partial liberalization in services. The PRC–Singapore agreement 
significantly builds on the ASEAN–PRC FTA by allowing for the movement of natural 
persons. By comparison, and with the notable exceptions of the India–Republic of Korea 
CEPA and the India–Singapore FTA, India’s FTAs seem more limited in services 
coverage. In a move to extend services coverage to the regional-level, a South Asian 
Trade in Services Agreement was signed in April 2010.  
 
The four Singapore issues are selectively covered in the giants’ FTAs. Seven of the 
PRC’s FTAs cover one or two Singapore issues. For instance, investment and trade  
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facilitation
11 are both covered in the PRC–New Zealand FTA and the PRC–Peru FTA, 
while the PRC–Pakistan FTA and the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement 
(ECFA) covers only investment. More sensitive issues of government procurement and 
competition policy are absent from the PRC’s FTAs. Meanwhile, the India–Republic of 
Korea FTA comprehensively covers three Singapore issues. While there is no separate 
chapter on government procurement, there is a cooperation provision on government 
procurement that opens the door for liberalization in this difficult area. Another four of 
India’s FTAs, including the South Asia Free Trade Area (SAFTA), only cover trade 
facilitation, while the India–Singapore FTA covers both trade facilitation and investment. 
The PRC and India’s remaining FTAs exclude the Singapore issues altogether.  
 
 
4.3  Are Free Trade Agreements as Used? 
 
Unfortunately, neither the PRC nor India publishes official data on FTA use from 
certificates of origin or information on impediments to using FTAs. This is a major gap 
that needs to be addressed in the future. Nonetheless, it is possible to explore the issue 
of FTA utilization by looking at trade with FTA partners, which is indicative of potential 
use, as well as evidence from a survey of firms.  
 
The giants’ increasing number of FTAs has been accompanied by trade with FTA 
partners gaining in importance in the 2000s. While the majority of international trade is 
still with non-FTA partners, about 27% of the PRC’s total trade and 23% of India’s was 
potentially covered by FTAs in 2008.
12 Encouragingly, these figures are up considerably 
from less than 5% in 2003.  
 
The relatively high FTA use among firms in the PRC compared with other Asian 
countries was a key finding of a recent multi-country, multi-enterprise ADB survey.
13 
About 45% of the firms surveyed in the PRC reported that they had used FTAs, with an 
additional percentage saying they planned to do so in the future.
14 FTA use in the PRC 
is higher than previously thought (Baldwin 2008). The ADB survey also highlights 
impediments to using FTAs at the firm level in the PRC. Interestingly, few firms seemed 
concerned by the Asian noodle bowl effect, with only 6% of the Chinese sample 
                                                  
11  Trade facilitation refers to the simplification and harmonization of the customs procedures that regulate 
international trade to reduce cost burdens while safeguarding legitimate regulatory objectives.  
12  The number of FTAs is relatively easy to track over time, but by themselves the numbers do not 
indicate the importance of FTAs to economic activity or trade at the national level. It is informative to 
get an idea of how much of a country’s world trade is covered by FTA provisions. This is difficult to 
measure because of exceptions and exclusions contained in many agreements. Furthermore, official 
statistics on utilization rates of FTA preferences in Asia are hard to come by and published data on the 
direction of services trade do not exist. Nevertheless, by making the bold assumption that all goods 
trade is covered by concluded FTAs, indicative estimates can be obtained. I am grateful to Richard 
Baldwin for this point.  
13  The ADB survey provided data on the incidence of firms that use FTAs in six Asian countries (Kawai 
and Wignaraja eds. 2011). Use of FTAs is as follows: the PRC (45%), Japan (29%), Thailand (25%), 
Republic of Korea (21%), Singapore (20%), and the Philippines (20%).  
14  Use of FTAs is closely linked to innovation and learning processes at the firm-level in the PRC, thereby 
underlining the importance of technology-based approaches to trade. Econometric analysis of the 
decision to export among a sample of PRC firms reveals that FTA use, export experience, foreign 
ownership, and R&D expenditures all influence the probability of exporting (Wignaraja 2010).   
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expressing concerns about significant transactions costs arising from multiple rules of 
origin in overlapping agreements. As more FTAs come into effect, however, the noodle 
bowl remains a future risk for the region. Instead, the key impediments to FTA use in the 
PRC turned out to be a lack of information on FTA provisions and business impacts, 
non-tariff measures in overseas markets, small margins of preference, and the 
availability of alternative export incentives (e.g., export processing zone schemes and 
the Information Technology Agreement).  
 
Unfortunately, information on use of FTAs is not yet available for Indian firms from the 
ADB survey or other sources. But discussions with the Federation of Indian Industry and 
Commerce (FICCI) suggested that its members were increasingly aware of the benefits 
of FTAs, such as the Indo–Sri Lanka FTA and the ASEAN–India FTA, and had begun to 
use them to facilitate the goods and services trade with FTA partners.
15 They also said 
that India’s FTAs with Sri Lanka and ASEAN had facilitated an increase in intra-regional 
investment in manufacturing and IT services. 
   
Thus, there seems little evidence of detrimental effects on exports of the PRC and 
India’s FTAs. The giants’ FTA strategies still appear to be in the formative stages. The 
PRC’s FTAs with regional developing economies are geared towards supporting its role 
as the global factory and the deepening of production networks. From an initial focus on 
South–South trade, India has recently moved toward seeking market access to East 
Asia and major developed countries. The PRC’s FTAs seem to have better coverage in 
terms of goods and services. FTA use, at least in the PRC, also seems higher than 
expected. Nonetheless, both countries can improve the coverage of Singapore issues in 
future FTAs and adopt best practices in designing rules of origin and in the 
administration of such rules. 
 
 
5.  Emerging Challenges since the Global Financial Crisis  
 
Growth in the PRC and India has rebounded from the global financial crisis while the 
world economy remains sluggish (ADB 2011). The global financial crisis marked the end 
of a period of respectable world growth and expanding employment in major industrial 
economies. Unprecedented fiscal stimulus efforts coupled with low interest rates averted 
a 1930s style economic depression. Nonetheless, slow economic growth with high 
unemployment in much of the developed world appears to characterize the likely 
scenario in the medium-term. This somewhat pessimistic scenario is linked to unusually 
high levels of public debt, the crisis in the eurozone economies, lackluster private 
investment, and fragile consumer confidence. Some developed countries are in the 
process of making large cuts in public expenditures, which may accentuate the 
slowdown at least in the short-run. A lack of progress in the WTO Doha Round on the 
magnitude of reductions in agricultural subsidies and industrial tariffs continues to 
deprive the world economy of a major source of trade-led growth. Added to this are the 
risks generated by soft labor and housing markets in the US, vulnerable sovereign debt 
positions in the eurozone, the aftermath of the earthquake and tsunami in Japan, and 
                                                  
15  Meetings with FICCI officials, including Manab Majumdar (Assistant Secretary-General, FICCI) and 
Manish Mohan (Senior Director, FICCI) in New Delhi on 12 April 2010.   
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rising commodity prices (ADB 2011). While the pace of world economic growth in the 
medium-term is difficult to forecast, the consensus forecast is for a downward direction.  
 
The new world macroeconomic era will pose several important commercial policy 
challenges for the PRC and India including (i) the risk of protectionism, (ii) exchange rate 
management, (iii) increased FTA use by businesses, and (iv) complementary policies.
16 
How well the giants tackle these challenges will partly determine the continued pace of 
their trade-led growth.  
 
Risk of protectionism. High unemployment in the wake of the global financial crisis has 
prompted influential industrial lobby groups in G-20 economies to call for the protection 
of domestic industries. Mass public sector redundancies induced by public sector 
expenditure cuts are likely to accentuate such calls in the future. The available evidence 
suggests a modest rise in protectionist measures in G-20 economies since 2008, with an 
emphasis on less transparent non-tariff measures (particularly sanitary and 
phytosanitary [SPS] and technical barriers to trade [TBT] measures),
17  public 
procurement, and local buy-back schemes, rather than more traditional industrial 
tariffs.
18 There has also been a rise in anti-dumping and safeguard measures with some 
targeting of highly-competitive, labor-intensive exports from the PRC and India. 
Concluding the WTO Doha Round offers the best insurance against rising protectionism 
and a modest deal would be better than no deal at all. The giants are well placed to 
steer WTO members towards a less ambitious Doha deal involving some reductions in 
agricultural subsidies and industrial tariffs as well as trade facilitation. Such a deal may 
be supported by increased aid for trade and enhanced special and differential treatment 
to mitigate negative effects on lesser-developed and small, vulnerable economies. In 
addition, the PRC and India need to improve surveillance of non-tariff measures in 
overseas markets, improve business support to cope with SPS and TBT measures 
affecting specific exports, and further upgrade legal capacity to deal with anti-dumping 
cases at the WTO.    
 
Exchange rate management. The PRC is now under international pressure to revalue its 
currency. Section 3 discussed the PRC’s exchange rate policy and export development. 
                                                  
16  Winters and Yusuf (2007) and Gerhaeusser et al, eds. (2010) comprehensively deal with other future 
economic policy challenges facing the giants including demographics, financial integration, the 
environment, and governance.  
17 During the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations, member nations established the 
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Measures and the Agreement on 
Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) to address the emerging debate over the use of standards in 
international trade. Generally speaking, the SPS Agreement is a compromise that permits countries to 
take measures to protect public health within their borders as long as they do so in a manner that 
restricts trade as little as possible. Similarly, the TBT Agreement strikes a delicate balance between the 
policy goals of trade facilitation and national autonomy in technical regulations. 
18  OECD, WTO, and UNCTAD (2010) suggests that new import restricting measures introduced on 1 
September 2009 covered 0.7% of G-20 imports and 0.4% of total world imports through mid-February 
2010. Similar figures for October 2008–October 2009 were 1.3% and 0.8%, respectively. The joint 
report concludes that there is no indication of a significant increase of trade or investment restriction 
during the period under review, but notes that some G-20 members have continued to put in place 
measures that potentially restrict trade, either directly or indirectly. New trade restrictions tend to be 
concentrated in sectors that are relatively protected and also relatively labor-intensive, including 
minerals, textiles, and metal products.   
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Recent policy attention, particularly in the US, has been devoted to the links between the 
management of the renminbi, the PRC’s trade surplus, and the US trade deficit. It has 
been suggested that the PRC’s exchange rate does matter for global rebalancing.
19 
These findings have led to influential voices calling in early 2010 for stepped-up 
multilateral initiatives in the IMF and the WTO to promote appreciation of the exchange 
rate of the renminbi (Bergsten 2010). On 19 June 2010, during the lead up to the G-20 
meeting in Toronto, the PBOC announced that it would further reform the renminbi’s 
exchange rate by shifting to a more flexible exchange rate policy (Hu 2010). In particular, 
the announcement indicated a continued emphasis on reflecting market supply and 
demand with reference to a currency basket, and maintaining wider exchange rate 
floating bands. Discussions in international fora and concerns about domestic inflation 
may lie behind the latest reforms. On 29 September 2010, the US House of 
Representatives passed legislation that would allow the US to use estimates of currency 
undervaluation to calculate countervailing duties on imports from the PRC and other 
countries. This move has sparked fears of a looming currency and trade war. A 
prolonged dispute over the currency issue could damage PRC–US trade and exert a 
negative impact on the two economies and the world economy. Accordingly, stepped up 
international diplomacy may be necessary to resolve the issue. As India becomes more 
prominent in world export markets, it is possible that its exchange rate management may 
also emerge as an international policy issue.  
 
Increased use of FTAs by businesses. Section 4 suggested that the giants have pursued 
a variety of FTAs to liberalize the goods and services trade in the region, and that FTA 
use among PRC firms was higher than expected. Awareness of FTA provisions, 
however, varies among business in the PRC and other Asian countries. Small- and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) seem less well-informed than large firms and tend to 
use FTAs less. Some firms also complain about cumbersome bureaucratic procedures 
associated with exporting through FTAs, such as stringent rules of origin and poor origin 
administration. Accordingly, both giants (particularly India) need adopt more proactive 
outreach measures to involve business associations in FTA negotiations and inform 
them of the benefits of FTAs through simple business guides and websites. They also 
need to adopt best practices in rules of origin in FTAs—co-equality of rules, regional 
cumulation, and origin administration by business associations—and enhance technical 
and other business support services to assist firms to make use of FTAs. In the medium-
term, a move towards a broad and deep Asia-wide FTA would significantly enhance 
business use of FTAs. It could provide a common and predictable policy framework for 
businesses, enable the realization of economies of scale, and be attractive to inward 
investment (Chia 2010). Model-based studies suggest that an ASEAN+6 FTA covering 
goods, services, and trade facilitation would bring higher welfare gains than alternative 
FTA scenarios. The formation of an ASEAN+6 FTA is expected to realize world income 
gains of around $260 billion (Kawai and Wignaraja 2011).  
 
Implementing complementary policies. Maintaining export competitiveness and shifting 
to new areas of comparative advantage in the PRC and India in the new macroeconomic 
                                                  
19  A recent econometric study by Cline (2010), for instance, based on certain assumptions, estimates that 
on a 2010 scale a 10% real effective appreciation would reduce the PRC’s current account surplus by 
$170 billion–$250 billion. The corresponding gain in the US current account balance would range from 
$22 billion–$63 billion.   
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era will require complementary supply-side support in addition to continuing with gradual 
commercial policy liberalization. The liberalization of trade and investment regimes 
provides incentives for firms to invest in competitive technological capabilities and link up 
to production networks, while supply-side support provides requisite inputs for the 
process.  
 
Enhancing cross-border infrastructure investment is a key area. A joint ADB and ADB 
Institute (ADBI) study in 2009 identified a huge need for infrastructure investment in 
Asia, which was estimated at about $750 billion annually in 2010–2020. The study also 
identified about 20 priority infrastructure projects, including several involving the giants. 
With large financial reserves emanating from export surpluses, the giants could play an 
enhanced role in financing large multi-modal, cross-border infrastructure projects 
involving neighboring economies. As Table 11 shows, the PRC spends more of its GDP 
on infrastructure than India. The PRC also fairs better than India on indicators of overall 
infrastructure quality as well as the quality of roads and electricity supply, according to 
opinion surveys of business people collected by the World Economic Forum.  
 
Increasing industrial R&D efforts is another key area of importance. R&D is a 
prerequisite for maintaining competitiveness in medium- and high-technology industries, 
and ensuring technology spillovers from FDI to local firms. Table 11 shows two 
measures of R&D efforts in the PRC and India since 1996, R&D expenditures as a 
percentage of GDP and the number of R&D researchers per one million people. The 
data indicates India lags significantly behind the PRC in both measures. Strikingly, 
India’s R&D expenditures are just under half that of the PRC’s, while its ratio of R&D 
researchers is about one-tenth of the PRC’s.  
 
Reducing bureaucratic impediments to conducting business is a final area of 
complementary policies. Both giants scored relatively high on the World Bank’s overall 
ease of doing business index in 2011, meaning that they still do less well compared with 
the world’s top performers while the PRC seems better placed than India. The PRC does 





This paper analyzed the role of commercial policies in the rise of the PRC and India in 
world trade over the last 3 decades. In a radical break with past economic policies, the 
PRC and India both adopted market-oriented commercial policies beginning in the late 
1970s to boost exports and the private sector. More recently, the giants have pursued 
FTA-led regionalism alongside multilateralism. Few foresaw the huge impact the giants 
would collectively have on world trade patterns or the magnitude of adjustments required 
in rest of the world.  
 
The trade performances of the PRC and India have been impressive by the standards of 
either developing countries or developed countries. Within a relatively short time span of 
roughly one generation, the giants have emerged as major players in world trade as well 
as notable outward investors. Following early entry into low-technology products, the 
giants have steadily upgraded into medium- and high-technology products, as well as  
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skill-intensive services. While the two are often compared, the PRC seems to have 
roared ahead in world trade in manufactures and is on the verge of challenging the US 
as the world’s largest exporter. India’s export expansion has been primarily driven by 
services and it is attempting to play catch up in a range of manufactured exports.  
 
The foundation for the giants’ successes lies in their respective initial conditions. These 
include the PRC’s proximity to Japan, which facilitated inward investment and a large, 
dynamic domestic market. In addition, both India and the PRC had access to ample 
supplies of low-cost, productive manpower.  
 
The switch in commercial policies has played a significant role in the trade performance 
of the PRC and India. The PRC, of course, was swifter and introduced an open door 
policy towards export-oriented FDI in the late 1970s alongside the controlled 
liberalization of imports. Further liberalization occurred in the PRC during the process of 
WTO accession. India introduced some reforms in the late 1970s, but the major reforms 
came after 1991. The differences in trade performance between the PRC and India, 
however, are not simply a matter of the timing of changes in commercial policies. Closer 
examination reveals that the PRC had a more comprehensive approach to attracting 
export-oriented FDI, actively facilitated the technological upgrading of exports through 
FDI, reduced import tariffs and the dispersion of tariffs in a more systematic manner, 
typically managed a more predictable and transparent REER, and pursued more 
comprehensive liberalization in goods and services provisions in its FTAs with Asia’s 
developing economies. In recent years, India has attempted to put in place appropriate 
commercial policies, particularly with respect to attracting export-oriented FDI and 
liberalizing tariffs. India is also attempting ambitious FTA negotiations with developed 
countries, which could provide market access and FDI inflows among other benefits. 
Therefore, the gap in trade and investment performance between the giants may narrow 




Both the PRC and India face a new and more uncertain world economic environment in 
the post-global financial crisis era. The effect of this new economic era on trade 
performance in the giants will depend on how each copes with the risk of protectionism, 
manages exchange rate issues, increases the use of FTAs by businesses, and 
implements complementary policies. Nevertheless, the giants seem well prepared to 
adapt commercial policies and other measures to successfully increase their dominance 
of world trade in the next decade. 
                                                  
20  Some popular accounts (The Economist. 2 October 2010) predict that India’s growth may overtake the 
PRC’s by 2013. Several factors are said to lie in India’s favor including a relatively young and growing 
workforce, and a base of world class companies led by English-speaking bosses and democratic 
institutions. Weighed against this is a much larger export base in the PRC; much higher levels of 
investment in R&D, skills, and infrastructure; and better policy coordination and implementation. I am 
grateful to Alan Winters for clarifying this point about the giants’ future prospects.   
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Figure 1: Real Effective Exchange Rate
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PRC = People’s Republic of China. 
Notes: 
/a consumer price index (CPI)-based, 2005 = 100; increase = appreciation.  
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Table 1: Exports and Imports of Goods and Services, 1978–2010 
 
   People’s Republic of China    India 















% of GDP                  
Exports of goods 
and services  6.6 9.9  20.8  20.3 36.6 26.7 31.8    6.4 5.3 8.6  11.1 22.7 20.6 22.9 
Goods exports  …  8.2  15.5 18.0 33.2 24.1 25.4    4.8 4.1 6.8 8.2  16.2 12.8 15.2 
Services exports  …  1.0 1.8 2.3 3.4 2.6 3.1    1.2 1.5 1.8 2.8 8.9 6.9 7.7 
Imports of goods 
and services  7.1 14.1  17.2  16.0 28.5 22.3 28.9    6.6 7.7 8.6  12.8 28.0 25.3 30.9 
Goods imports  …  12.5 13.2 13.4 24.8 19.1 25.4    5.5 6.6 7.9  10.8 27.2 18.9 22.7 
Services imports  …  0.8 1.1 2.6 3.7 3.2 3.5    1.2 1.7 2.2 3.5 4.9 6.2 8.2 
 
% of the World                   
Exports of goods 
and services  0.6 1.3 1.7 3.0 8.0 8.4  11.0    0.6 0.5 0.5 0.7 1.3 1.7 2.0 
Goods exports  …  1.3 1.7 3.3 9.1 9.8  12.8    0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 1.2 1.4 1.7 
Services exports  …  0.7 0.8 1.7 3.8 3.7 4.9    0.6 0.8 0.5 0.8 2.7 2.6 3.2 
Imports of goods 
and services  0.7 1.8 1.4 2.4 6.4 7.2  10.3    0.6 0.7 0.5 0.8 1.7 2.1 2.8 
Goods imports  …  2.0 1.4 2.5 6.9 7.9  11.6    0.6 0.8 0.6 0.8 2.0 2.1 2.7 
Services imports  …  0.6 0.4 1.9 4.5 4.9 5.9    0.5 0.9 0.6 1.0 1.6 2.5 3.6 
 
Exports of goods 
and services 
(current $, billion)  9.8 30.5  78.9  207.4  1581.7 1333.3 1748.0   8.6 12.2  23.0  46.4  262.8 269.7 326.0 
Imports of goods 
and services 
(current $, billion)  10.5  43.1 65.3  163.6  1232.8  1113.3  1587.0     9.0 17.8  23.0  53.4  324.8 330.8 440.0 
Source: 
/a World Bank. World Development Indicators. http://databank.worldbank.org/ (accessed April 2011); 
/b World Trade Organization (2011).  
34     |    Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 83   
   
 
Table 2: Manufactured Exports from the People’s Republic of China and India,  
1985 and 2008 
 
Growth Rate, 1985–2008 (%)   
Share of national manufactured 
exports, (%) 1985 2008
PRC     PRC   
Manufactures  26.7     Resource-based  38.9 8.5
Resource-based  18.6     Low Tech  43.7 26.8
Low Tech  24.2     Medium Tech  12.2 37.0
Medium Tech  33.3     High Tech  5.2 27.7
High Tech  36.2       
        
INDIA    INDIA   
Manufactures  15.4     Resource-based  40.6 35.0
  Resource-based  14.6     Low Tech  45.3 31.8
  Low Tech  13.7     Medium Tech  10.0 24.9
  Medium Tech  20.2     High Tech  4.1 8.3
  High Tech  18.3     Resource-based  40.6 35.0
        
        
  
Share of World Manufactured Exports 
(%) 1985 2008
   PRC    
   Manufactures  0.5 10.8
     Resource-based  0.8 3.5
     Low Tech  1.2 18.1
     Medium Tech  0.1 10.6
     High Tech  0.1 14.3
      
   INDIA  
   Manufactures  0.5 1.3
     Resource-based  0.9 1.7
     Low Tech  1.2 2.5
     Medium Tech  0.1 0.8
     High Tech  0.1 0.5
 
 
PRC = People’s Republic of China. 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on UN Comtrade. http://comtrade.un.org/ (accessed December 2009).  
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Table 3: Commercial Services Exports, 1985 and 2008 
 
Growth Rate, 1985–2008 (%)   
Share of National Commercial Services 
Exports (%)  1985 2008
PRC    PRC   
Commercial services  18.6  
  Computer, communications, and other 
services  15.3 44.7
  Computer, communications, 
and other services  24.2     Insurance and financial services  6.7  1.2
  Insurance and financial 
services  10.0     Transport services  44.5  26.2
  Transport services  15.9     Travel services  33.5  27.9
  Travel services  17.7       
        
INDIA    INDIA   
Commercial services  16.1  
  Computer, communications, and other 
services  55.6 72
  Computer, communications,  
and other services  17.4     Insurance and financial services  1.3  5.5
  Insurance and financial services  23.6     Transport services  15.7  11
  Transport services  14.3     Travel services  27.4  11.5
  Travel services  11.8          
        
        
  
Share of World Commercial Services
Exports (%)  1985 2008
   PRC    
   Commercial services  0.7 3.8
  
  Computer, communications, and other 
services  0.4 4.1
     Insurance and financial services  1.2 0.6
     Transport services  1.0 4.2
     Travel services  0.8 4.1
      
   INDIA  
   Commercial services  0.8 2.7
  
  Computer, communications, and other 
services  1.5 4.7
     Insurance and financial services  0.3 1.9
     Transport services  0.4 1.2




PRC = People’s Republic of China. 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on World Bank, World Development Indicators. http://databank.worldbank.org/ 
(accessed June 2010). 
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Table 4: The People’s Republic of China’s Comparative Advantages by Sector, 
2000 and 2009 (Revealed Comparative Advantage [RCA] >1) 
 
HS 









     Rank 
(out of 44)  RCA  Rank 
(out of 47)  RCA 
46  Manufactures of plaiting material, basketwork, etc. 
(LT)  71.2  1 8.0454 3  14.0000 
66  Umbrellas, walking-sticks, seat-sticks, whips, etc 
(LT)  70.1  2 7.0228 1  15.0400 
67  Bird skin, feathers, artificial flowers, human hair (P)  62.9  3  6.9969  2  14.7000 
50  Silk  (P)  46.4  4 4.6066 4 9.6500 
65  Headgear and parts thereof  (LT)  42.0  5 4.4085 7 6.3200 
63  Other made textile articles, sets, worn clothing etc 
(LT)  40.0  6  4.1839 12 4.9800 
61  Articles of apparel, accessories, knit or crochet 
(LT)  33.7  7  3.8745 16 4.4900 
64  Footwear, gaiters and the like, parts  thereof  (LT)  33.6  8 3.5945 9 6.0400 
58  Special woven or tufted fabric, lace, tapestry etc 
(LT)  34.6  9  3.3938 27 2.6100 
42  Articles of leather, animal gut, harness, travel 
goods (LT)  35.3  10  3.3662 5 8.2800 
95  Toys, games, sports requisites  (LT)  32.4  11  3.3599 6 7.0200 
62  Articles of apparel, accessories, not knit or crochet 
(LT)  29.7  12 3.2923 14 4.8800 
60  Knitted or crocheted fabric (LT)  29.5  13 2.9969 25 2.8000 
96  Miscellaneous manufactured articles  (LT)  30.3  14 2.9786 22 2.9500 
94  Furniture, lighting, signs, prefabricated buildings 
(LT)  27.0  15 2.6196 32 2.2400 
52  Cotton  (P)  23.2  16 2.4272 18 3.1400 
92  Musical instruments, parts and accessories  (LT) 23.5  17 2.4102 26 2.6200 
53  Vegetable textile fibres nes, paper yarn, woven 
fabric (RB)  22.4  18 2.3962 13 4.9200 
54  Manmade filaments (MT)  22.1  19 2.3010 44 1.1800 
55  Manmade staple fibres (MT)  23.6  20 2.2968 19 3.0900 
69  Ceramic  products  (RB)  24.3  21 2.2173 31 2.2900 
59  Impregnated, coated or laminated textile fabric 
(LT)  22.4 22  2.1384  n.a. n.a. 
89  Ships, boats and other floating structures (MT)  19.7  23 1.9824  n.a.  n.a. 
43  Fur skins and artificial fur, manufactures thereof 
(LT)  22.5  24 1.9136 20 2.9800 
85  Electrical, electronic equipment (HT)  18.4  25  1.9036  43  1.2200 
36  Explosives, pyrotechnics, matches, and 
pyrophorics (MT)  21.0  26 1.8795 15 4.5500 
05  Products of animal origin, nes  (RB)  18.5  27 1.8163 10 5.5000 
83  Miscellaneous articles of base metal  (RB)  17.3  28 1.6366 36 1.6300  
The People’s Republic of China and India   |   37 
   
 
HS 









     Rank 
(out of 44)  RCA  Rank 
(out of 47)  RCA 
81  Other base metals, cermets, articles thereof  (RB)  17.0  29 1.5832 29 2.5200 
51  Wool, animal hair, horsehair yarn and fabric 
thereof (P)  16.0  30 1.4933 30 2.4700 
82  Tools, implements, cutlery, etc of base  metal  (LT)  15.9  31 1.4650 33 2.0700 
16  Meat, fish and seafood food preparations  nes  (RB)  13.2  32 1.4577 21 2.9700 
84  Machinery, nuclear reactors, boilers, etc (MT/HT)  16.2  33 1.4393  n.a.  n.a. 
73  Articles of iron or steel (LT)  15.2  34 1.4230 39 1.5600 
68  Stone, plaster, cement, asbestos, mica, etc articles 
(RB)  15.1  35 1.4072 41 1.3400 
70  Glass and glassware (RB)  14.5 36  1.3880  n.a. n.a. 
57  Carpets and other textile floor coverings (LT)  12.9  37  1.3189  42  1.3200 
03  Fish, crustaceans, mollusks, aquatic invertebrates 
nes (P)  9.8  38 1.1085 40 1.4500 
56  Wadding, felt, nonwovens, yarns, twine, cordage, 
etc (RB)  11.7 39  1.1034  n.a. n.a. 
20  Vegetable, fruit, nut, etc food preparations  (RB)  10.7  40 1.0935 38 1.5700 
07  Edible vegetables and certain roots and tubers (P)  10.2  41  1.0882  35  1.8400 
13  Lac, gums, resins, vegetable saps and extracts 
nes (P)  12.0 42  1.0429  n.a. n.a. 
86  Railway, tramway locomotives, rolling stock, 
equipment (MT)  11.2  43 1.0227 11 5.1300 
14  Vegetable plaiting materials, vegetable products 
nes (RB)  8.6  44 1.0027 28 2.5300 
 
HT = high-technology manufactures, LT = low-technology manufactures, MT = medium-technology manufactures, P = primary, RB = resource-
based manufactures.  
 




/a estimates from World Bank. World Integrated Trade Solution. http://wits.worldbank.org/wits/ (accessed April2011) 
/b estimates from 
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Table 5: India’s Comparative Advantages by Sector, 2000 and 2009 














         Rank  
(out of 37)  RCA  Rank  
(out of 42)  RCA 
71  Pearls, precious stones, metals, coins, etc (RB)  10.2  1  7.4000  6  9.1800 
50  Silk  (P)  9.8  2 6.5937 2 16.4300 
57  Carpets and other textile floor coverings (LT)  8.5  3  5.8813  4  9.9800 
52  Cotton  (P)  7.7  4 5.4905 3 11.3400 
13  Lac, gums, resins, vegetable saps and extracts 
nes (P)  8.4  5 4.9454 1 17.0100 
53  Vegetable textile fibres nes, paper yarn, woven 
fabric (RB)  6.5  6 4.6826 8  7.5700 
26  Ores, slag and ash (RB)  5.0  7  4.1648  24  2.4300 
14  Vegetable plaiting materials, vegetable products 
nes (RB)  5.1 8  4.0449  10  6.1000 
63  Other made textile articles, sets, worn clothing etc 
(LT)  5.5  9 3.9220 5  9.2800 
67  Bird skin, feathers, artificial flowers, human hair (P)  5.1  10  3.8659  13  3.9000 
09  Coffee, tea, mate and spices (P)  5.1  11  3.7800  7  8.3500 
54  Manmade filaments (MT)  5.3  12 3.7222 22  2.5600 
55  Manmade staple fibres (MT)  4.7  13 3.1297 18  3.0600 
62  Articles of apparel, accessories, not knit or crochet 
(LT)  3.9  14 2.9342 11  5.4800 
10  Cereals  (P)  3.9  15 2.8040 19  2.9700 
61  Articles of apparel, accessories, knit or crochet 
(LT)  3.2  16 2.5413 16  3.3400 
79  Zinc and articles thereof (RB) 3.6  17  2.5257  n.a.  n.a. 
25  Salt, sulphur, earth, stone, plaster, lime and 
cement (RB)  3.3  18 2.3930 15  3.6700 
23  Residues, wastes of food industry, animal fodder 
(RB)  3.4  19 2.3592 17  3.1300 
42  Articles of leather, animal gut, harness, travel 
goods (LT)  3.3 20  2.1459  9  7.1600 
99  Commodities not elsewhere specified (LT)  1.4  21  2.0047 n.a.  n.a. 
89  Ships, boats and other floating structures (MT)  2.6  22 1.7879  n.a.  n.a. 
41  Raw hides and skins (other than fur skins) and 
leather (P)  2.7  23 1.7713 21  2.7400 
24  Tobacco and manufactured tobacco substitutes 
(RB)  2.6  24 1.7614 36  1.2400 
68  Stone, plaster, cement, asbestos, mica, etc articles 
(RB)  2.6  25 1.6639 23  2.5100 
03  Fish, crustaceans, mollusks, aquatic invertebrates 
nes (P)  2.0  26 1.5621 12  4.9100 
29  Organic chemicals (RB)  2.4  27  1.4462  31  1.5700  
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HS 










         Rank  
(out of 37)  RCA  Rank  
(out of 42)  RCA 
64  Footwear, gaiters and the like, parts thereof  (LT)  1.8  28 1.2919 26  2.2000 
32  Tanning, dyeing extracts, tannins, derivs, pigments 
etc (RB)  2.1  29 1.2798 27  1.9800 
27  Mineral fuels, oils, distillation products, etc (RB)  1.4  30  1.2738  n.a.  n.a. 
36  Explosives, pyrotechnics, matches, pyrophorics, 
etc. (MT)  2.1  31 1.2671 39  1.1800 
58  Special woven or tufted fabric, lace, tapestry etc 
(LT)  1.9  32 1.2661 14  3.8700 
73  Articles of iron or steel (LT)  1.9  33 1.2282 30  1.6200 
07  Edible vegetables and certain roots and tubers (P)  1.7  34  1.2160  28  1.7700 
08  Edible fruit, nuts, peel of citrus fruit, melons (P)  1.5  35  1.1570  20  2.9200 
72  Iron and steel (RB)  1.6  36  1.1133  34  1.2900 
74  Copper and articles thereof (RB) 1.5  37  1.0243  n.a.  n.a. 
 
HT = high-technology manufactures, LT = low-technology manufactures, MT = medium-technology manufactures, P = primary,  
RB = resource-based manufactures.  
 




/a estimates from World Bank. World Integrated Trade Solution. http://wits.worldbank.org/wits/ (accessed April2011) 
/b estimates from 
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Table 6: Commercial Policies: Timing and Features 
 
People’s Republic of China (PRC) India 
Attracting export-oriented foreign direct investment (FDI) 
•  Passage of an export processing law (1979. 
•  Adoption of a dualistic trade regime that promoted 
exports via FDI (mid-1980s) 
•  Eased regulations on the entry and operation of 
foreign enterprises through the Sino-Foreign Equity 
Joint Venture Law of 1979, Sino-Foreign Cooperative 
Joint Venture Law of 1986, and the Wholly Foreign-
Owned Enterprise Law of 1988 
•  Creation of Special Economic Zones (SEZs) (1980s) 
•  Introduction of tax incentives and facilitation of 
financing to channel FDI toward SEZs 
•  Liberalization of labor regulations in SEZs 
ensuring relatively low wages and ample 
supply of skilled workers 
•  Formalization of a duty drawback system to ensure 
duty-free access to materials used in export 
processing (1987 onward) 
•  Gradual liberalization of restrictions on 
foreign ownership through a system of 
automatic clearance for FDI proposals 
and the opening up of new sectors to 
foreign ownership (e.g., mining, 
banking, telecommunications) (1991 
onward) 
•  Permission of 100% foreign ownership 
in manufacturing sectors (1991 
onward) 
•  Passage of a Special Economic Zones 
Act to promote exports more 
systematically (2005)   
Import liberalization 
•  Passage of a customs regulation to rationalize tariff 
schedules (1985) 
•  Liberalization of the system of export licensing and 
quotas (from covering two-thirds of exports in 1991 to 
only 8% in 1999) 
•  Implementation of tariff reductions implemented 
following the adoption of a socialist market (1992 
onward) 
•  Further reforms to import control regime implemented 
as part of World Trade Organization (WTO) accession 
in 2001 
•  Introduction of a package of trade and 
investment reforms (1991) 
•  Abolition of import licensing on 
machinery and raw materials (1991) 
•  India, as signatory to the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT), became a founding member 
of the WTO on 1 January 1995 
•  Abolition of licensing on consumer 
goods (2001) 
Exchange rate management 
•  Devaluation of domestic currency and move to 
currency convertibility of account transactions (1997) 
•  Adoption of a managed floating exchange rate (mid-
2005 onward) 
•  Unification of the dual exchange rate 
system and commencement of current 
account convertibility (1994) 
• Maintenance of a depreciated 
exchange rate 
FTA strategies 
•  Accession to its first free trade agreement (FTA), the 
Asia-Pacific Trade Agreement (2001) 
•  Signing of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN)-PRC FTA (2005) 
•  11 FTAs in effect as of April 2011 including bilateral 
agreements with Thailand; Hong Kong, China; 
Macao, China; Chile; New Zealand; Pakistan; 
Singapore; Peru; and Taipei,China  
•  Signing of its first FTA, the Asia-Pacific 
Trade Agreement (1976) 
•  Signing of the South Asian FTA (2006) 
•  11 FTAs in effect as of April 2011 
including bilateral agreements with Sri 
Lanka, Nepal, Afghanistan, Singapore, 
Bhutan, Chile, and Republic of Korea; 
and a plurilateral agreement with Latin 
American countries  
 
Source: Author’s compilation. 
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Table 7: Foreign Direct Investment (current $, billion), 1978–2010 
 
  PRC India
Total FDI inflows (current $, billion)  1098.7 
Annual average FDI inflows (current $, billion)    
1978–1990    1.6  191.3 
1991–2010  54.0 0.1 
1991–2002  35.6 9.5 
2003–2010  81.5 2.5 
2008  108.3 20.0 
2009  95.0 41.6 
2010  105.7
/a  34.6 
FDI inflows (% of GDP) 
  
1991–1995  3.8 0.2 
2004–2010  2.6 2.0 
2008  2.4 3.4 
2009  2.0 2.8 
2010  1.9 1.5 
Share of multinational companies in exports (%), most recent estimate
/c  55 <10 
Total outward FDI (current $, billion) 1995–2009  182.0 73.1 
Annual average outward FDI (current $, billion) 
  
1995–2005  3.8 1.0 
2006–2009  38.6 16.7 
2008  52.2 18.5 
2009  48.0 14.9 
 
FDI = foreign direct investment, PRC = People’s Republic of China. 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from UNCTAD. UNCTADStat. http://unctadstat.unctad.org/ (accessed April 
2011); 
/a estimates from the Government of the People’s Republic of China’s Ministry of Commerce. 
http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/statistic/foreigninvestment/201101/20110107381641.html accessed on April 2011 
/b 
estimates from the Government of India’s Ministry of Commerce and Industry 
http://dipp.nic.in/fdi_statistics/india_FDI_December2010.pdf (accessed April 2011); 
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Table 8: Simple Average Applied Most Favored Nation Tariffs  
by Broad Sectors—1996, 2001, 2008, and 2009 
 
  
People’s Republic of China       India 
1996  2001  2008  2009      1996 2001 2008 2009 
All 23.7  15.9  9.6  9.6    38.7  31.9 13 12.9 
Agricultural products  34.1  20.3  15.6  15.6    23.1 36.3 32.2 31.8 
Non-agricultural 
Products 22.8  15.5  8.7  8.7     40.1 31.4 10.1 10.1 
 
Source: World Trade Organization, WTO Statistics Database-Tariff Profiles. 
http://stat.wto.org/TariffProfile/WSDBTariffPFHome.aspx?Language=E (accessed April 2011). 
 
 
Table 9: Most Favored Nation Applied Tariffs and 
Share of Imports by Product, 2009 
 
Product Groups 
People’s Republic of China  India 
MFN Applied 
Duties 
Imports MFN  Applied  Duties    Imports 
Avg. Max. Share  (%) Avg. Max.    Share (%)
Animal products  14.8  25 0.2  33.1  100    0.0 
Dairy products  12.0  20  0.1  33.7  60    0.0 
Fruit, vegetables, plants  14.8 30  0.2  30.4  100    0.9 
Coffee and tea  14.7  32  0.0  56.3  100    0.1 
Cereals and preparations  24.2  65  0.2  32.2  150    0.0 
Oilseeds, fats, and oils  10.9  30  3.3  18.2  100    1.3 
Sugars and confectionery  27.4 50  0.0  34.4  60    0.1 
Beverages and tobacco  22.9  65  0.2  70.8  150    0.1 
Cotton 15.2  40  0.3  12.0  30    0.1 
Other agricultural products  11.5  38  0.5  21.7  70    0.3 
Fish and fish products  10.7  23  0.5  29.8  30    0.0 
Minerals and metals  7.4  50  18.8  7.5  10    33.3 
Petroleum 4.4  9  15.4  3.8  5    29.1 
Chemicals 6.6  47  11.3  7.9  10    7.5 
Wood, paper, etc.  4.4  20 2.5  9.1 10    1.6 
Textiles 9.6  38  1.5  13.6  246    0.9 
Clothing 16.0  25  0.2  16.1  68    0.0 
Leather, footwear, etc.  13.4 25  1.6  10.2  70    0.7 
Non-electrical machinery  7.8  35  11.8  7.3  10    9.1 
Electrical machinery  8.0  35  20.1  7.2  10    7.7 
Transport equipment  11.5  45 3.8  20.7  100    4.5 
Manufactures 11.9  35  7.3  8.9  10    2.6 
 
MFN = most-favored nation. 
 
Source: World Trade Organization, WTO Statistics Database-Tariff Profiles.http://stat.wto.org/TariffProfile/ 
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Table 10: Classification of People’s Republic of China and India FTAs, April 2011 
 
   Country/FTAs  Goods 
Liberalization
/a  Coverage of Services Sectors
/b  Coverage of Singapore Issues
/c 
PRC        
1  Asia-Pacific Trade Agreement (2001)  partial   no provision  no provision 
2  PRC-Thailand FTA (2003)  partial  no provision  no provision 
3  PRC-Hong Kong, China CEPA (2004)  WTO-compliant  partial   no provision 
4  PRC-Macao, China CEPA (2004)   WTO-compliant  partial   no provision 
5  ASEAN-PRC FTA (2005)  WTO-compliant  Partial  partial (investment) 
6  PRC-Chile FTA (2006)  WTO-compliant  partial   partial (trade facilitation) 
7  New Zealand-the PRC FTA (2008)  WTO-compliant  partial   partial (investment, trade facilitation) 
8  PRC-Pakistan FTA (2007)  partial  partial   partial (investment) 
9  PRC-Singapore FTA (2008)  WTO-compliant  comprehensive  partial (trade facilitation) 
10  PRC-Peru FTA (2009)  WTO-compliant  partial  partial (investment, trade facilitation)  
11  Cross-Strait Economic Cooperation 
Framework Agreement (2010)
 /d  partial partial  partial  (investment) 
India       
1  Asia-Pacific Trade Agreement (1976)  partial  no provision  no provision 
2  India-Sri Lanka FTA (2001)  WTO-compliant  no provision  no provision 
3  India-Nepal Treaty of Trade (2002)  partial  no provision  partial (trade facilitation)  
4  India-Afghanistan PTA (2003)  partial   no provision   no provision 
5  India-Singapore CECA (2005)  WTO-compliant  comprehensive  partial (investment, trade facilitation) 
6  South Asian FTA (2006)  partial  partial(SATIS signed)*  partial (trade facilitation) 
7  India-Bhutan Trade Agreement (2006)  partial  no provision   partial (trade facilitation) 
8  India-Chile PTA (2007)  partial  no provision   no provision 
9  India-MERCOSUR PTA (2009)  partial  no provision   no provision 
10  India-Republic of Korea CEPA (2009)  WTO-compliant  comprehensive  comprehensive (government 
procurement cooperation only) 
11  ASEAN-India FTA (2009)  partial  no provision   Partial (customs procedure 
cooperation only) 
 
  ASEAN = Association of Southeast Asian Nations, FTA = free trade agreement, PRC = People’s Republic of China. 
Source: Author’s estimates based on ADB’s Asia Regional Integration Center Database. http://aric.adb.org (accessed April 2011). 
Notes: a/ An FTA is WTO-compliant, following GATT Article 24, where tariffs are eliminated on at least 85% of either or both FTA members’ tariff lines (or goods traded) 
within 10 years. Otherwise, it has partial coverage. b/ Comprehensive coverage of an FTA covers the five key sectors of the General Agreement on Trade in Services 
(GATS): business and professional services, communications services, financial services, transport services, and labor mobility/entry of business persons. No provision 
means there are no liberalization provisions for the services sector. Partial are those not otherwise classified as comprehensive or no provision. c/ Comprehensive are 
those which cover all of the Singapore issues: investment, competition policy, government procurement, and trade facilitation. Partial if only 1–3 Singapore issues are 
covered in the FTA. No provision means those without any provisions for Singapore issues. 
/d This refers to the FTA between the PRC and Taipei,China, which came into 





















































































Table 11: Infrastructure, Business Regulation, and Technology 
 
Indicators  Year PRC  India 
Infrastructure spending (% of GDP)
 /a  2008 11  6 
Quality of over-all infrastructure
/b  2010–2011 72  91 
Quality of roads
/b  2010–2011 53  90 
Quality of electricity supply
/b  2010–2011 52  110 
      
      
Ease of doing business index (1=most business-friendly regulations)
 /c  2010 79  134 
  Starting a business
/c  2010 151  165 
  Registering property
/c  2010 38  94 
  Enforcing contracts
/c  2010 15  182 
  Closing a business
/c  2010 68  134 
      
R&D expenditure (% of GDP)
 /d  1996 0.6  0.7 
  2007 1.5  0.8 
Researchers in R&D (per million people)
 /d  1996 448  154 
   2007/2005 1071  137 
 
GDP = gross domestic product, PRC = People’s Republic of China. 
 
Source: 
/a estimates from the Government of India’s Ministry of Finance, Indian Economic Survey 2010–2011. http://indiabudget.nic.in/index.asp 
(accessed April 2011); 
/b World Economic Forum (2010); 
/c World Bank and International Finance Corporation (2010); 
/d World Bank, World 
Development Indicators. http://databank.worldbank.org/ (accessed April 2011).  
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